Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar argued in his statements that “the wealth of the Aegean should be shared fairly”. Clearly, Mr. Akar is referring to the theory of distributive justice about how wealth or any other good is fairly distributed. We can say, for example, that the good to be distributed should be equally divided among all interested parties, or we can say that the greater part should be given to the one who needs it the most, or the one who deserves it the most, or finally . . the one who can use it better. Did this mean the Turkish official?

Whatever consideration he has in mind, Mr. Akar is missing something essential. As in interpersonal relations, so in interstate relations, what everyone is entitled to is determined by his pre-existing rights, since they are ensured by the existence of a system of public justice. You can, of course, doubt the existence of other people’s rights, but then you can go to court. The completely different idea that someone can have the “right” to appropriate something that belongs to another is just rhetorical, otherwise it is empty. My field belongs to me, even if a magic tree suddenly grows, giving exotic fruits in demand. The neighbor here does not have the right to vote, even if he wants to get what has grown in my field. He can negotiate its acquisition by offering me some price or exchanging it for something else of equal value, but he certainly has no right to seize it by force.

Thus, the request for a “fair distribution of the wealth of the Aegean” cannot be about existing rights themselves, but only about actual displacement and its potential side effects, and perhaps also about the obligations corresponding to these rights. We cannot, however, claim a share in things that supposedly do not belong to us, and if we believe that some states (or individuals) have excessive wealth and abuse their power, then this only concerns the principles of world society. Let’s work together to improve them. Nothing, however, gives the state the right to correct this situation on its own, and even by force and in its own interests. Even assuming that the call for “justice” is not abused (which is rare), we can all imagine the chaos that would result if states could forcefully change borders or transfer wealth and resources every time. . . . Therefore, we do not mean a literal redistribution of wealth, but the effective enforcement of rights and obligations for all through their impartial confirmation by public courts, in this case recognized by the international legal order.

What free and democratic states owe to each other is the mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The meaning of the existence of international law, as by analogy and internal legal order, is not in the “fair distribution of wealth”, as everyone understands it. If this were the case, then each state would have the right to claim the wealth of another at any time, by force and threat calling into question the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states. In essence, no state can be sure of its constitution and survival (and no citizen of its rights), even if it is challenged by peaceful means. What free and democratic states owe to each other is mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity and a reasonable measure of (non-coercive) assistance to those states and their citizens who cannot live in security and freedom. The Aegean, like any sea, has great wealth, but its exploitation by all presupposes, first of all, the recognition and description by a public court of the relevant rights that the participating States have or may have under existing international law. The minimum condition for this is the cessation of violent and hostile behavior and the realization of the value of the fruits of peace for future generations.

* Mr. Konstantinos A. Papageorgiou was Professor of Philosophy of Law at the Faculty of Law of EKPA.