The new tactic of Russian aggression against Ukraine is the destruction of vital infrastructure, with an emphasis on the energy sector. Without access to uninterrupted sources of energy, the sustainability of Ukraine is subject to severe tests. However, if the population lacks basic public services and the economy is at a standstill, the state cannot function as such, becoming a failed state. This is exactly the scenario promoted by Russian officials and propaganda during September, after the Ukrainian counteroffensive proved effective, and Russia’s partial mobilization was the main flaw.

Moscow justified the new wave of attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure by the need to respond to the partial destruction of the Kerch bridge (built in 2016-2018), built to provide transport links between the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea (forcibly annexed by Russia in 2014) and the Russian Krasnodar region. After the attack on the Russian Bridge was classified as a “terrorist act”, Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized the missile attack on critical infrastructure facilities in Ukraine as a measure to counter the terrorist threat. Thus, after October 10, Russia launched more than 100 missiles (and self-destructing drones) from the territory of the Russian Federation, occupied Crimea, and from Russian warships in the Black Sea and the Caspian Basin. In just 2 days, Russian missiles hit about 30% of the Ukrainian energy infrastructure (in Kyiv and more than 10 regions of the country).

Both the components of the Ukrainian energy system and the Ukrainian social infrastructure (schools, kindergartens, etc.) are experiencing billions in losses. In addition to Russian weapons, self-destruct drones imported from Iran were also used (NYT, October 2022). Due to the impact of Western sanctions on domestic arms production, Russia is forced to purchase missiles, drones and artillery components from North Korea and Iran (Fateh-110, Zolfaghar, Mohajer-6, Shahed). The military-political interest of Moscow is to use ground-to-ground weapons as destructively as possible to make the territory of Ukraine under the control of the constitutional authorities uninhabitable. In this way, Russia avoids resorting to a “nuclear” scenario (IPN, September 2022), using winter conditions and testing Ukraine’s energy survivability to force it to capitulate. Although the continuation of the war seriously affects the stability of Ukraine, it creates pressure on the Putin regime domestically and limits Russia’s geopolitical assets, especially in the post-Soviet space.

Geopolitical consequences of attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure

Unlike previous Russian airstrikes, including on critical infrastructure in Ukraine, international organizations have strengthened their stance on Russia following the current escalation of Russian aggression. Thus, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution that the political regime of Vladimir Putin is “terrorist” (October 13, 2022). Even if it does not entail any legal consequences and is limited to the Western Hemisphere, the official comparison of the Russian authorities with “terrorists” is a victory for Ukrainian diplomacy in the information war against the Russian side.

Therefore, Russia’s share in the post-Soviet space is now decreasing. The results of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, together with the increase in war crimes by the Russian army against the Ukrainian population and the state, are turning into a “war of geopolitical attrition” for Russia. This is manifested in the loss of relevance of the Russian factor in its traditional areas of influence. In particular, changes are taking place at the level of security configurations in the South Caucasus, where the role of the CSTO and individual security guarantees of Russia (Armenia) are losing their political symbolism. In their place, the services of other providers of geopolitical influence are expanding. Thus, the EU is going to deploy a civilian mission (40 people for an initial period of 2 months) to support efforts to demarcate and stabilize the borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. This will be the second EU mission after the one created in Georgia (in 2008) to monitor the situation around the Russian-controlled territories of Georgia – Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The countries of Central Asia are also actively talking about the fact that Russia has not made its contribution to the development of the region based on mutual interests and respect.

Defeats in Ukraine undermine the external legitimacy of Russia, which exposes the political regime in an extremely negative light. So far, Putin has projected his power domestically through image capital from the outside – respect based on fear of military rule and energy dependence. Currently, both are deeply shaken by the events in Ukraine. Therefore, in order not to lose control over the newly annexed Ukrainian territories and undergo a new therapy of national shame, the Russian authorities intend to destroy one of the current engines of stability of the Ukrainian state – the energy potential.

Russian calculations, stability of Ukraine and consequences for the West

Russia’s decision to target Ukrainian infrastructure stems from several main considerations. First, the Ukrainian army is advancing towards the territories occupied by the Russian side, and the partial mobilization carried out over the past three weeks testifies to the state of military morale exhaustion of Russia. For this reason, the return to some extended attack zones of Russian weapons against Ukraine is intended to slow down the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Second consideration it may be the loss of magnetism caused by the annexation of Ukrainian regions, which was condemned by 143 UN countries in the final resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine (35 states abstained, 5, including Russia, were against). This, along with the destruction of the Kerch Bridge, forced Putin to feed the propaganda and Russian public, increasingly disillusioned and confused, with some minimally favorable prospects for Russia. Not leastRussia intends to exploit Ukraine’s vulnerabilities, which could become acute if the infrastructure that produces electricity and provides the population with hot water, heating agent and purified water is destroyed. In this sense, Russian missiles are aimed at de-electrification of Ukraine, which will paralyze the economy as much as possible and restore waves of refugees.

Ukraine’s stability depends both on military aid, which continues to come from the USA and the EU, and on financial aid for the country’s budgetary needs. According to World Bank estimates, the Ukrainian economy risks shrinking by 50% in 2022, and the poverty rate will increase from 2% in 2021 to 50% in 2023 (Reuters, October 2022). The continuation of the war increases the country’s dependence on external financing. Kyiv is asking international partners for at least $55 billion (loans and grants) to support the budget deficit in 2023, of which $17 billion is for the reconstruction of social and critical infrastructure in the energy sector. Estimates so far show that Russian aggression has caused at least $350 billion in physical destruction. At least $252 billion in costs were also recorded as a result of the paralysis of the economy during the almost 8 months of war.

Although the US is the main donor country, it has more resources and fewer institutional constraints to increase aid to Ukraine than the EU. The latter has suffered from the secondary consequences of sanctions against Russia, has serious problems with access to energy resources and harbors most of the Ukrainian refugees who are cared for by EU countries with European financial support. By the end of September, the United States had allocated $8.5 billion, and another $4.5 billion was requested for financial assistance. At the same time, the European side promised to allocate 9 billion euros, of which it allocated 1 billion euros and plans to transfer another 3 billion euros by the end of 2022 (FT, September 2022).

Securitization of critical infrastructure is the main solution for the stability of the state

As in Ukraine, the main risk emanating from Russia through the end of the year and into 2023 is the security and viability of critical infrastructure. The destruction of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines (one thread of the two) has raised the level of alarm in the EU and NATO about the need to protect the main elements of critical underwater infrastructure aimed at pipelines that deliver energy resources (in the North Sea – from Norway; in the Mediterranean Sea – from Algeria to Italy), as well as Internet cables, which are used for the operation of about 94% of the European business environment and the functioning of communal services (digital water supply). supply systems, agriculture, etc.) depend.

Critical infrastructure security is an important element of civil preparedness that must be organized, tested and tested over time to prevent any acts of sabotage. At the same time, Western partners must supply anti-missile systems to protect Ukrainian energy. Germany has already transferred the IRIS-T system, and France will transfer the Crotale system in November 2022.

A certain anti-missile umbrella could have been deployed to protect the Ukrainian energy infrastructure several months ago, before the winter period. Rather due to a misalignment of priorities, this seems to have been overlooked and is now being exploited by Russia. Ukraine has a maximum of 2 weeks-1 month to restore elements of the energy infrastructure destroyed by missiles and drones launched by Russia. With the help of technical teams from the EU countries, the repair of the infrastructure should be completed as soon as possible, after which it should be equipped with Western anti-missile systems. Due to the lack of this protection, Ukraine has already been forced to suspend the flow of electricity supplied to the EU (ENSTO-E), as well as to Moldova (about 30% of the electricity consumed). The energy deficit exposes the state stability of Ukraine to serious challenges that can affect the military potential and effectiveness of the counteroffensive. Read the full article and comment on Contributors.ro