“Like a paper tower, the opposition’s complaints about the scandal involving the legal connection of Mr. Androulakis’ mobile phone and the work of the EMP” refers to the opinion submitted by the ND to the parliamentary commission of inquiry investigating the case.

According to unofficial information, the SI opinion contains detailed chapters on the process of investigating cases at all levels that existed, on deprivation of the confidentiality of Mr. Androulakis’ phone, on illegal monitoring software, reports on de-privacy on SYRIZA-ANEL, as well as proposals to modernize the institutional framework of the EYP.

In particular, in the opinion submitted by ND to the Commission in the case of “violation of the confidentiality of communications of the President of PASOK-KINAL and MEP Mr. Nikos Androulakis EPM or other individuals or entities, a confirmed attempt to intercept a mobile phone using Predator malware, its unlawful use in the territory and investigation into the existence of the responsibility of the Prime Minister Mr. Kyriakos Mitsotakis and any other person or entity involved”, the following stated:

About the procedure

From the work of the Parliamentary Investigative Committee and the testimony of all witnesses, it is absolutely clear that the government served the purpose of investigating the Androulakis case, institutionalizing the framework for legal declassification and the need to strengthen the work of AIP.

At the government level: Immediately after the appearance of the relevant facts, an Act of Legislative Content was issued to immediately strengthen the institutional guarantees in the EMP, with the obligation to listen to the Governor and reinstate the need to approve a request for legal assistance. declassification by the second prosecutor, a provision that was repealed in 2018 by the SYRIZA-ANEL government.

From the testimony of the witnesses and the submitted documents, it appears that the declassification of Mr. Androulakis’ mobile phone was absolutely legal based on the request of the EMP service, signed by the officials and the commander of the EMP, to the competent prosecutor, who issued the declassification order. From the testimony of the former commander of the EMP, Panagiotis Kontoleon, it turned out that all the procedures prescribed by law were followed.

It appears from the testimony as a whole that there are absolutely no exceptions under the Constitution and privacy laws to the deprivation of the rights of any class of citizens. Thus, in accordance with the Constitution and Executive Law 2225/1994, it is accepted that the withdrawal of confidentiality can also be carried out for MEPs or MEPs. After all, the involvement of politicians in actions against national security, voluntarily or involuntarily, cannot be ruled out a priori. In addition, the same law outlines the elements to be included in a confidentiality withdrawal clause both in the case of national security considerations and in the case of crime checks.

There was no evidence that the prime minister, his staff, or his associates knew of the declassification at any stage. This was assured by the then responsible Panagiotis Kontoleon, adding that the Prime Minister, as the political head of the EEM, set the general targeting framework without delving into the substantive or procedural issues of the work of the service. After all, it was standard practice, as confirmed by former commander Theodoros Dravilas. The current commander, Themistoklis Demiris, also testified that he did not give the order to destroy any file.

From the testimony of ADAE President Christos Rammos, it was confirmed that the EYP proceeded to remove Mr. Androulakis’ confidentiality in accordance with the law and under the supervision of the EYP prosecutor, while not a single political person among those who applied to find out whether they are under surveillance, including Mr. Spirtzis, there was no observation by the EMP.

Mr. Androulakis’s position on the political expediency of his two-month monitoring is nullified by EEM’s constant tactics, as described in their testimony by all previous administrators who appeared before the Commission of Inquiry, i.e. court applications. within two months in each case, without exception.

About illegal tracking software

The attempt to hijack a mobile phone with Predator malware was clearly not carried out by EYP or any other government organization. In particular, to a critical question about the possible use of the Predator surveillance software in Greece, the government replied that neither this nor any other similar malicious system is used by the state or any of its departments. It was confirmed that the state did not purchase illegal surveillance software, and the audit showed that Krikel has entered into a cooperation agreement and the supply of equipment, however, not related to surveillance software, with the Ministry of Citizens’ Protection since 2018, i.e. . , during the reign of SYRIZA, followed by subsequent contracts with EL.AS. The owner and manager of Krikel revealed that the company’s contracts with the Greek state, which began in March 2018, are not about Predator malware or similar systems, but about intercom devices used by ELAS executives to communicate with each other. In addition, he stated that he had never worked with EYP and did not personally know Mr. Dimitriadis.

The manager of Intellexa stated that she has never sold products or services to individuals, government agencies or other entities in Greece, that there is no relationship between Intellexa and Krikel, and that she has never had any contact with Mr. H. Demetrias i Condoleon.

All administrators stated that EYP never purchased malware. EAD Deputy Commander Alexandra Rogaku testified that ELAS and EYP did not enter into agreements allowing the use of Predator-type software. EAD’s investigation into the EYP contracts was thorough and focused.

Regarding the removal of privacy from SYRIZA-ANEL

The testimonies of the witnesses completely clarified the picture and illuminated all aspects, and also showed that during the reign of SYRIZA-ANEL, government officials known to Mr. Tsipras were under the supervision of EEM.

Former EYP commander Rubatis admitted that during the SYRIZA-ANEL period government officials were being monitored. The telephone connection of Mr. Picciorla started from the beginning of 2016 until the end of the same year, even when he was appointed from November 2016 as a government minister. The then Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras was informed by the then EYP commander Giannis Rubatis that Mr Pitsiorlas would soon be connected to the phone and approved the action. His predecessor, T. Dravilas, expressed anger at those who claimed that during his tenure, from July 2012 to January 2015, Mr. Saia and Picciorla were under surveillance. The PASOK-KINAL president downplayed Rubati’s revelations about the sighting of Pichiorla, facts he carefully avoided mentioning despite questions asked by committee members.

Proposals for the modernization of the institutional framework

Responding to the need to make the work of the EYP more transparent without compromising its effectiveness and the critical mission it has to fulfill in protecting our national rights, we are making a number of proposals that include:

– Strengthening the legal framework for declassifying political figures. In addition to the approval of any legitimate declassification by a second prosecutor, the activation of an additional filter, more specifically by a politician, should be evaluated. The circle of politicians includes members of the government and deputy ministers, deputies, deputies of the European Parliament, general/special secretaries, and chairmen/secretaries of political parties.

– Changes to EYP to increase internal control, transparency, extroversion and training of their human resources.

– Prohibition of the sale of surveillance software to individuals and the introduction of a separate provision prohibiting and penalizing the sale (sale and purchase) of surveillance software to individuals.

– Interventions in the context of personal data protection, institutional strengthening of the Anti-Corruption Commission to fulfill its constitutional role, creation of a cybersecurity body as a coordinating mechanism, reassessment of the institutional framework for notification subject regarding the introduction of a restrictive measure to remove privacy, investments to protect the country’s critical infrastructure from threats security and investment of the recovery fund in this direction.

– Awareness of citizens and departments. In this context, it is recommended that the competent authorities of the state communicate with citizens and institutions regarding recommendations on the use of technological devices and applications, as well as the organization of seminars on digital security at all levels of formal education.