Based on the reality of where the Black Sea is located, we notice that this space is determined by the geography of the region. We are used to perceiving the static profile of this basin due to the restriction of access to the Black Sea through the Turkish straits – the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Turkey’s sovereignty over the straits limited the access of the Soviet Union, and later Russia, to the Mediterranean Sea to a certain extent (not permanently). This strategic need to protect a growing Russian presence on Europe’s southern flank has allowed Moscow to operate unhindered here, projecting the regional status quo. In addition to its naval power in the Black Sea, Russia has made significant efforts to keep the political regimes in the region in its orbit, and to ensure the longevity of its influence, it has created artificial conflicts under the pretext of protecting Russian minorities in the territory of neighboring states. This tactic was to send occupation forces into the territory of other sovereign states, which Moscow mistakenly called “peacekeeping forces.” Whenever the exercise of political control by the Kremlin failed, the use of force became an acceptable option to preserve the regional status quo.

Although the Black Sea has not benefited from the so-called internationalization, the region has always been the object of abuse by Russia, and it is interesting that this geopolitical reality or oblivion has somehow been neglected by the exception according to which the US has tolerated the existence of a space in which it does not have global maritime hegemony. The consequences of this exception ultimately led to increased Russian ambitions in the Black Sea region, as well as a form of dependence of coastal villages on a security intermediary capable of providing external support and guarantees. We will not be mistaken if we admit that the Black Sea region remains a complex space with weak prerequisites for the implementation of a joint stability project.

However, however unlikely it may seem at the moment that the internationalization of the Black Sea would benefit from unhindered access to the planetary ocean, the use of large rivers and streams is worth exploring. In addition to the investment cost, some technical studies are required to determine the feasibility of these large infrastructure projects. To date, there are several shipping routes that could provide contiguous access to the Black Sea through the construction of canals.

• Such investments directed by China to connect the Aegean Sea with the Danube, respectively from Greece through North Macedonia and Serbia (Thessaloniki-Belgrade), are estimated at 17 billion US dollars. From the point of view of navigation and the goal of contributing to the stabilization of the Black Sea, Serbia under the leadership of Aleksandar Vučić could rather present differences of vision against some strategic reasons related to its partnership with Vladimir Putin.

• Another shipping option could connect the Baltic Sea with the Black Sea, respectively Poland with Ukraine and Romania (Visula/Gdańsk-Galatz), by building an artificial canal, the length of which is estimated at 72 km. This much older idea appears to have been initiated during Nicolae Iorga’s diplomatic activities with Take Ionescu to establish a Romanian-Polish river link with commercial and security implications.

• A third alternative waterway is represented by the Istanbul Canal, the brainchild of President Erdoğan, but it is unclear what shipping management regime will be applied and which investment partners will be willing to finance this mega-project, however, here too, China seems to have shown a strategic interest.

• The fourth waterway, which has been discussed over time, concerns the Dnipro-Buzka canal project, which is considered as a connecting bridge between the Baltic and Black seas, but which is out of the question today due to the geographical conditions of transit through Belarus.

Several studies available from academic and independent think tanks show that these potential canals would increase regional trade flows and tourism, irrigation potential in agriculture, could reduce pollution from cargo traffic, and smaller frigates could sail from the planetary ocean to the Black Sea. seas, defying the restriction requirements of the Montreux Convention, which gives Turkey the right to restrict the access of warships through the two straits if it feels threatened.

As with any crisis, there are a number of opportunities, Russia’s war in Ukraine has the effect of raising awareness among allies of the need to strengthen security in the Black Sea. The lack of Western penetration of this highly specific geopolitical space in the past has highlighted the vulnerability that Moscow has faced in its desire to project its regional hegemony. Putin used this strategic vacuum to attack Ukraine, launched long-range missiles from the sea to support his ground offensive, and advanced a revisionist agenda, publicly supporting the Kremlin’s goal of reconfiguring Europe’s borders and returning to the Cold War order. This behavior just confirmed Russia’s desire to get out of the geopolitical isolation it recently found itself in.

Since March, I have written that the Russian Federation is moving towards the status of a regional power, accepting the role of China’s junior partner, while the redistribution of global power is contested by the US and China. As soon as Russia felt the inevitability of geopolitical isolation, its options narrowed to regional variable rates. This new situation increased Russia’s ambitions in the Black Sea and complicated the security climate there.

Figures provided by analysts and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine suggest that Kyiv now has the enhanced military and technological capabilities to mount a powerful counteroffensive, while Russia’s window of opportunity continues to narrow. Massive losses in people, equipment and supplies, demoralization of the troops, recruitment of new poorly trained fighters are variable factors of a humiliating defeat for Putin. We can only assess, on the basis of publicly available data, some tentative indications of Russia’s ability and ambition to sustain this war. This information indicates that the resistance of the Russian army has a linear tendency to decrease, and with the arrival of autumn and the rains, the main enemy of mechanized movement becomes mud. Given the positive scenario for Ukraine, it is possible that Putin’s soldiers will voluntarily return home in the near future.

The other day, a friend from Kyiv asked me “what my scenarios say about a possible Russian attack on the Zaporizhzhia NPP.” Putin, surrounded by the mafia, eventually got us used to bluffing. Less than a month after the invasion began, Putin ordered nuclear forces on alert. These extremely psychologically stressful practices are used as a pressure factor to contain the Ukrainian military response and the West’s commitment to Kyiv, and also open channels of discussion between the parties in which the Kremlin unilaterally announces its claims. Although the deployment of Russian munitions at the Zaporizhia NPP seemed like an inspired tactic, the general weakening of Moscow’s military power does not turn the industrial facility into a long-term redoubt. It is a complete absurdity when Ukrainians cause a nuclear accident in Zaporizhzhia, on their own territory, when after so many human dramas and efforts, they finally managed to establish military supremacy. As for Putin, it may seem tempting to create a nuclear threat for at least two reasons, one personal and the other strategic: he knows he will lose a war he created and has a chance to retaliate, while a nuclear threat would turn a vast area into a no-man’s land, i.e. buffer zone between Russia and NATO. However, this scenario is unsustainable, as a nuclear accident caused by Moscow would ultimately throw Russia into international isolation, and even Putin, for all his skill, would not be able to control the direction of the radioactive cloud. The largest urban settlements in Russia are located on the outskirts of Europe, being directly affected by possible nuclear contamination.

Putin has no reason to resort to the tactics of the scorpion in the famous fable “The Scorpion and the Tortoise”, because his main concern is to save Russia from geopolitical drowning. Although we might think that Putin has become an irrational individual because of his military failure, his main concern is not his political future. Putin has been careful to steer Russia toward totalitarianism, and his inner circle of power seeks to preserve their privileges by forming a joint body with him. Therefore, internal control measures work and become increasingly draconian. Read the rest of the article on Contributors.ro