Decision of the President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan is interpreted in Greece through an internal sensorium of perception of international events, with the main criterion being the fear of a repetition of the summer of 2020, when the armed forces of the two countries arrived shortly before open conflict, in connection with the “Oruchs Reis”. However, Mr. Erdogan appears to have acted not only on the basis of the purely geopolitical chess currently being played around Ukraine, but also on the medium and long-term needs of the Turkish economy. One of the underestimated aspects is Turkey’s objective need to support its industry, which is more than 50% completely dependent on imported natural gas. For the Erdogan government, which despite huge inflation bases its domestic consumption arguments on the objective fact that Turkey’s growth rate always exceeds the most optimistic forecasts, access to cheap natural gas is paramount. According to the Turkish Energy Regulatory Agency (EMRA), in 2022, natural gas consumption is expected to grow by 18.8% compared to 2021 and reach a record level (about 62 billion cubic meters).

This, of course, explains Ankara’s attitude towards Moscow. However, the Turkish government and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPO) have acted in recent years on the basis of potential gas concentrations obtained from previous 2D and 3D surveys. Such indications exist throughout the area between the coast of the Gulf of Antalya, where Abdul Hamid Khan will be active for the next (at least) two months, and in the area to the north and around Karpasia, where Turkish research vessels of the Barbaros type have been carefully analyzed in previous years.

These elements are also what led in the previous period of time to the assessment of government officials in charge of monitoring and analyzing Ankara’s movements in the Eastern Mediterranean that Turkish drilling would follow a logic based on the need to have results in the search for hydrocarbons. As long as this very linear logic is observed, the Turks will inevitably move in the coming months also to the areas where Oruch Reis moved in the summer of 2020. And especially in the southeastern part of the potential (based on the full influence of Kastelorizos) Greek Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf, where, at least based on the scientific arguments of Turkish competent scientists, there are signs of natural gas concentration. As is known, at least officially, the Greek side denies that the Oruchskaya Rasa carried out searches in these areas between August and November 2020.

Apart from this dimension, it is clear that Erdogan has sincerely entered into the process of normalizing relations with the US, a process which is also the result, of course, of the fact that, despite the intricate “tango” that Ankara dances with Moscow (but also Kyiv) and Tehran (but also Riyadh), there is no significant reaction from Washington. Moreover, the threat of tension in the Aegean to get a response from Washington is currently a much less useful tool for Ankara than top US priorities, such as the rapid entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO. The first meeting of representatives of the three countries is expected on August 26 under the mechanism established at the June NATO summit, with Ankara already showing dissatisfaction with the progress made by Stockholm and Helsinki. If you add to this the role of Ankara in the export of grain from Ukraine, it becomes clear that negotiations with Washington on all issues related to Turkey (including F-16) take place at several levels.

The Greek government is expected to be glad that the summer and, it seems, the fall will go smoothly (at least in national affairs), but a lot can change in the coming election months. Athens is expecting even higher rhetorical tones, which Erdogan seems to enjoy. An even more important problem than the “crowns” that find their way into the news bulletins every day is the lack of communication channels at almost all levels. According to one analysis, especially at this juncture, with the Greek government facing multiple problems at home, Mr. Erdogan is unwilling to lend a “helping hand” by creating tension in the Aegean. However, the atmosphere will remain tense as Ankara presses for demilitarization issues while any new issue is expected to be brought up for discussion in an upcoming new letter from Turkey’s Permanent Mission to the UN.