When Joe Biden became President of the United States, he brought with him the best team, perhaps the most experienced group of political experts in modern US history. “Their mission was to restore America’s tarnished reputation abroad and set the course for its global future,” writes Penguin Random House in its presentation of Alexander Ward’s The Internationalists.

“The challenges and risks could not be greater. Around the world, adversaries consolidated their power, allies split, wars broke out and climate change accelerated as Russia destroyed democracies and China sought to replace the United States as the world’s dominant power. Now, for the first time since World War II, the United States is in danger of losing its preeminent position. If Biden and his team fail, it will most likely spell the end of the American era and the emergence of a fragmented and autocratic world order.”

About the book and the author

In the book Internationalists / Struggle to restore America’s foreign policy after Trumpnational security reporter Oleksandr Word looks behind the scenes of the struggle to implement a coherent and effective set of policy measures in times of global crisis.

After the failure in Afghanistan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Biden’s team faces a big challenge. Its successes and failures will decide not only the Biden presidency, but also the course of America’s global future.

“Through meticulous reporting and insider accounts, Ward offers the first unvarnished history of the Biden doctrine, from the fall of Kabul to the rise of Kyiv,” writes Penguin Random House.

Alexander Ward lives in Washington, D.C., is a national security reporter for POLITICO and host of National Security Daily. Ward was previously the White House national security reporter for Vox. He was assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, where he worked on military affairs and US foreign policy. Ward also wrote the #NatSec2016 newsletter, where he covered the 2016 presidential election and the candidates’ views on national security.

A secret meeting

On the sidelines of the G20 meeting in Rome in October 2021, US President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan invited four European politicians into a small space. The event was attended by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, French President Emmanuel Macron and Acting Chancellor Angela Merkel, accompanied by her designated successor, Olaf Scholz. The topic of the somewhat cryptic conversation was Russia’s plans to invade Ukraine.

The Americans’ warning was very urgent because they had information to support their conclusions. Soon, perhaps as early as January, President Vladimir Putin will order an invasion, which he would have warned, from the United States. The European reaction would be different. While Macron allegedly asked if there were still ways to dissuade Putin from his plans, the Germans questioned the premise of the threat.

“Merkel and Scholz were skeptical about whether Russia would really do it. Especially Merkel,” writes journalist Alex Ward in his recently published book Internationalists. The former German chancellor misjudged the situation, believing that Putin only threatened to see if he would get something. She reportedly believed the Russian president was “not crazy,” and Scholz, Ward writes, agreed with Merkel’s position. In fact, on February 24, 2022, Russia’s offensive against Ukraine began.

Harmony and Nord Stream 2

German-American relations are now better than they have been in a long time. Biden and Scholz seem to get along well and emphasize their similarities and connections at every public opportunity. But that doesn’t mean there aren’t occasional tensions between Washington and Berlin.

Especially regarding the war in Ukraine, clashes between the partners repeatedly arose. Ward said that while Biden and Scholz celebrate their political friendship, there is sometimes growing frustration in the White House with German partners he sees as indecisive.

A stumbling block in transatlantic relations has been Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline, a project the Biden administration has insisted be halted, but the federal government has refused to make the move public.

According to author Alexander Ward, this was impossible, as Berlin allegedly told US national security adviser Sullivan Ward, because it would “further complicate the new chancellor’s already strained relationship with the German companies building the energy route and jeopardize his a weak political position”.

The fact that Scholz resolutely refused to publicly abandon Nord Stream-2 led the White House “to despair.” Washington eventually told Berlin that Biden would announce the end of the pipeline if Scholz did not. At a joint press conference between the president and the chancellor in the East Room on February 7, 2022, Biden did just that. If Russian tanks or troops cross the border with Ukraine, “then Nord Stream-2 will no longer exist.”

Even after this clarification, Scholz avoided publicly announcing the completion of the energy project. Domestically, the federal government said there was “no clarity” between the German and American positions. However, after the Russian invasion, Scholz declared the Nord Stream 2 pipeline dead.

Frictions on the topic of tanks

A year later, the next reason for dissatisfaction appeared: in January 2023, Ukraine secured the delivery of German Leopard 2 tanks – a request that was supported in Washington. But the Germans did not want to deliver. The Americans were told in Berlin that such a move would be too provocative and dangerous for the chancellor’s political survival.

“The pacifist wing of his party, the Social Democrats, will almost certainly rise against him (Scholz),” White House officials said, according to Ward. Therefore, the German chancellery agreed to supply Leopard 2 tanks only if the Americans send Abrams tanks to Kyiv. Scholz presented the corresponding plan to American representatives on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos.

The initiative was not approved. Even Senator Chris Coons, a close friend of Biden and no opponent of Scholz, disagreed. But this did not deter the chancellor from his plan. “These were Abrams tanks for Leopard. There was no wiggle room,” Ward writes. Only when Foreign Minister Blinken floated the idea of ​​promises of future Abrams deliveries did Berlin change its position and promise to deliver Leopard tanks.

Biden was relieved that a resolution had been reached — even though the Defense Department still had reservations about taking delivery of the Abrams tanks, primarily for logistical reasons.

“While he understood the Pentagon’s objections, it was more important to him to preserve transatlantic unity at a time when it was being seriously challenged,” the book says. “Military logistics were a secondary concern for the president compared to maintaining close relations with important allies.”