The probability that Russian troops will arrange an “accident” at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZAEP) is small, reports the Institute for the Study of War (ISW)which indicates that such a possibility cannot be ruled out, but analyzes what the consequences of such a possible scenario would be, especially on the battlefield.

ISW’s analysis comes after Volodymyr Zelenskyi accused Russia of planning a “terrorist” attack on the nuclear power plant with a release of radiation ten days ago, and on Friday the Military Intelligence Service of Ukraine (MIS) said Moscow was gradually reducing the number of personnel at the ZANP .

Is an “accident” at Zaporizhzhya NPP likely?

ISW says Russian forces are unlikely to cause a deliberate “accident” at the ZNPP, and Russia is likely to continue to use the threat of a deliberate radioactive incident to try to influence Ukraine’s counteroffensive actions and Western support for Ukraine ahead of an upcoming NATO summit.

ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces would not be able to control the consequences of a deliberate radioactive incident at the ZNPP and that a radioactive incident could further impair Russia’s ability to consolidate its occupation of southern Ukraine, rendering these areas uninhabitable and ungovernable.

However, Russia’s alleged destruction of the dam at the Kakhovskaya HPP also had a negative impact on Russian forces, and possible Russian plans to sabotage the ZANP cannot be ruled out.

What radioactive incidents could the Russians have caused

Moscow’s forces could carry out several possible man-made radioactive incidents at the ZNPP, some more serious than others.

Russian forces may dump irradiated water from the nuclear power plant into the Kakhovka Basin to prevent a potential Ukrainian crossing through the now mostly dry reservoir.

Russian forces could also try to create a radioactive cloud that covers a larger area of ​​southern Ukraine, although the reactors are designed to make that difficult.

In the Zaporizhzhia region, from June 9 to September 3, northerly winds most often prevail, although in the forecasts of wind directions in the territory after the end of the evacuation period on July 5, the GUR notes, days with a predominance of easterly winds are predicted.

Russian troops would suffer more

The radiation release from the ZNPP will certainly affect Russian forces in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions and possibly Crimea, and will likely have a greater impact on Russian forces than on Ukrainian forces, given the usual wind direction in the area.

Russian forces could carry out an “accident” that would create a smaller radioactive radius, focusing directly on preventing Ukrainian advances near the ZNPP itself.

None of these options would be of greater military benefit to Russian forces than the possible consequences they would cause.

Ukraine, for its part, would not get any benefit from a radioactive incident at the ZNPP, which would be far out of proportion to the huge price it would pay, irradiating the lands and people it is trying to liberate and hindering its own advancement in the area.

This makes attempts by Russian intelligence to establish the conditions to blame Ukraine for such an incident completely implausible, even if they could do so without physically occupying the plant.

Moscow responds with absurd speculations designed to scare the West

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on Friday that Zelensky’s previous statements that Russia was preparing an attack on the ZNPP may actually be evidence that Ukrainian officials are preparing an attack on the facility to draw NATO into the war in Ukraine.

Zakharova’s absurd speculations are typical of the Kremlin’s information operations regarding threats to the safety of the ZNPP.

The Kremlin has consistently used threats of nuclear escalation and warnings of threats to the ZNPP, mainly from Russia, in an attempt to pressure Ukraine to curtail military action and prevent further Western support for Ukraine.

Moscow is likely trying to signal a false intention to create a radioactive incident at the ZANP, hoping to create fear of a Ukrainian crossing of the Kakhovsky Reservoir in the area so that Russian forces do not have to defend a larger area of ​​the front.

The Kremlin’s rhetoric on nuclear blackmail is also largely aimed at a Western audience, and the resurgence of escalation signals and rhetoric around the ZNPP is likely in part to influence Western decision-making on Ukraine ahead of a NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, starting July 11, the Institute for the Study of War reports .