Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive, which may have already begun, may turn out to be as unproductive as Russia’s winter offensive. Defenders usually have an advantage over attackers in trench warfare, and the Russian military has had months to dig into its fortifications, the New York Times reported, citing Rador.

But at the same time, it is also possible that Ukraine will achieve great victories that could end the war this year. And what will happen then? How should all this end?

The controversial “we should not humiliate Russia”

We could start by listing ways it shouldn’t end. The first one was proposed last year by French President Emmanuel Macron.

“We must not humiliate Russia so that on the day hostilities cease, we can build an exit ramp through diplomatic means,” he argued.

At the time, “not humiliating Russia” was a euphemism for allowing Russia to keep its illegal conquests while it was still on the offensive at the time.

“We need a crushing victory”

wrong. A crushing and resounding victory is exactly what is needed to put an end to Russia’s imperialist aspirations. It’s easy to forget now, but last year’s invasion marked the third time Vladimir Putin has launched a war of aggression, intimidation and annexation against a neighbor after invading Georgia in 2008 and seizing Ukrainian territory in 2014.

And I haven’t even counted the cyber war against Estonia, the assassinations on British soil, the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 or the destruction of the cities of Aleppo and Grozny.

Each such act of aggression went virtually unpunished, tempting Russia to commit the next one. If the war in Ukraine ends with Putin achieving at least part of his goals, but also not suffering irreparable consequences for his regime, the only way out the West would find would be Putin’s path to his next villainy.

Similarly, if the Ukrainians breach Russian borders in a way that forces Putin to seek a deal—perhaps brokered by China—some voices will argue that a Korean-style cease-fire and truce is preferable to the risk of a sharp escalation.

And the Kremlin could try to encourage such an argument by swinging the nuclear saber again, this time perhaps even louder.

But even though nuclear risk should never be ignored, a closer look shows that it lacks substance in this case.

The reason Putin has not yet used tactical nuclear weapons in this war is not because of the moral qualms that would disappear if he felt cornered.

The reason is that this weapon was specially designed to destroy mass accumulations of armored vehicles, and on the front with scattered forces in Ukraine, it has no purpose.

And perhaps because the Biden administration has threatened unspecified “catastrophic consequences” if Russia uses such a weapon — perhaps the sinking of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea or some other strong but non-nuclear NATO response.

Why the South Korea analogy is not a good one

The more general problem with the truce model is that it would freeze the conflict in a way that would allow Putin to resume the war as Russia licks its wounds and regains its strength.

As for Ukraine, it will be forced to turn into a garrison state even under the conditions when its economy was mutilated by the war.

Those who draw the analogy with South Korea miss two things. First, Russia is inherently stronger than North Korea.

Second, peace on the Korean Peninsula has been maintained for 70 years by a massive and continuous US military presence – and there are relatively few Americans who want that duplicated in Ukraine.

The alternative is victory. This is what Ukrainians deserve, what most people want and what they demand from their political leadership.

This goal has been both hindered and facilitated by President Biden’s variable willingness to give Ukraine the tools to defeat it.

He’s also hampered by his own ambivalence about the outcome he wants, short of preventing Russia from winning and blowing up the planet in the process.

Victoria also has two options

The first, and the most risky, is to provide Kyiv with the necessary weapons – mainly long-range guided missiles, more tanks, Predator drones and F-16 jets – not only to push Russia out of the territories seized in the current war, but also to win back Crimea and the separatist “republics” in the east. This is what Ukrainians want and have a moral and legal right to receive.

But it will be difficult to win back Crimea, and even success will bring funds, primarily in the form of a population that does not necessarily want to be freed from Kyiv.

Hence the second option: help Ukraine restore its borders from February 2022, but no more – plus compensation in the form of EU membership and a security treaty between the US and Ukraine modeled on US-Israeli security cooperation.

Will such a decision increase America’s vulnerability to Russian aggression?

No, he would reduce it, for the same reason why Putin did not dare to attack the Baltic states, members of NATO, although he attacked Ukraine twice: dictators attack the weak, not the strong. Would this satisfy Ukraine’s need for security? Yes, it will have guaranteed access to both European markets and American weapons.

And will it humiliate Putin? In the best way, proving to him and other despots from Russia, but not only, that aggression against democracies never pays off. New York Times (acquisition of Rador)