DIMITRIS V. TRIANTAFILLIDIS
Russia is the great enemy of the West
ed., Epicentro, p. 150
Russian imperial nostalgia is a Eurasian temptation
ed.. Epicenter, page 90

“Having freed ourselves from the Tatar yoke, we must throw off the European yoke,” wrote Prince Trubetskoy.

The friendly feelings of a significant part of the Greeks towards Russia, sometimes vague and often having a doctrinal origin, religious or political, constitute the common ground on which every embittered anti-Westernist, no matter where he comes from, finds solace. The beliefs mobilized to support them, which are decisive for the attitude to a large – geographically – country, from whatever sphere of influence they may arise, were often formed through scattered and patchy knowledge. A country that has fallen into many sins is treated with trepidation and tenderness, feelings directly opposite to what logic would dictate, if it could, based on the actual behavior of Russia towards hostile or friendly peoples. And of course Greece. We did not have those tender, friendly, almost loving – from absurdity – feelings that we notice in our attitude towards Russia towards any people that supported our national independence. Against.

The constant search for national identity is not an obscure “suffering” and, perhaps, can be indicated as a point of Greco-Russian connection, along with the alleged identification of “foreigners” who persecute us and plot our greatness. However, the justifications that can be made for a relatively new people like ours do not apply to Russia, which from 1054 to this day has been searching for this famous identity, persistently denying coexistence on the basis of a social contract, because it delivers – over time – this refers to a paternalistic figure, be it Peter the Great, or Stalin, or Putin. Explanations are needed, and there are many of them, because for so many years Russian politicians and thinkers have been looking for and planning the paths that their people will follow with confidence and self-confidence, so many Western politicians and thinkers have tried to explain. analyze and understand why the West is constantly on the verge of a final divorce from the Russians, with incalculable consequences, although often ominous predictions for both sides.

In his two interesting books, Dimitris Triantafyllidis attempts to cross this Russian landscape in which the quest for identity lies, conditions which – impressively – are always determined in relation to the West either by pro-Westerners or, mainly, by anti-Western intellectuals, as well as by the recently disillusioned, and now for many of us, the “Russian soul”. He deeply analyzes the main direction of Russian anti-Westernism, which substantiates the reasons why the West and Russia cannot unite ideologically: Eurasianism.

Eurasia

According to this concept, Russia is not Europe or Asia, but a separate continent: Eurasia. It is found in the ideas expressed by F. Dostoevsky (“Russia is not only in Europe, but also in Asia – Russian is not only a European, but also an Asian – Asia can promise us much more than Europe and it is Asia that can determine our fate in future”), V. Solovyov (“Pan-Mongolism! No matter how wild this word sounds sweet to my ear”) and others. In Western literature, the Soviet Union is also one of the three superpowers that dominate the world, having mutated into Eurasia in the dystopia of the era of the future, as described by George Orwell in “1984” and also in science fiction master Robert Heinlein’s story “The Unsatisfactory Solution”, which we find as the “Eurasian Union”.

It originated in the Russian emigration in the 1920s as a reaction to the nightmare of the First World War and the defeat of the pro-Western Russian liberals by the Bolsheviks. The founders of Eurasianism argue that Russian culture is neither European nor any of the Asian cultures, and is not the sum or mechanical combination of elements of different cultures. “This is a unique and special culture, which has no less value and historical significance than European or Asian culture. It should be contrasted with the cultures of Europe and Asia as an intermediate space. The term does not cancel the right of the Russian people to leadership. […] We must realize our Eurasianism in order to find our Russian character in ourselves. Having freed ourselves from the Tatar yoke, we must also shake off the European yoke,” wrote one of the founders, Prince N. Trubetskoy.

Although the term has been defined and interpreted in many ways, in essence it simply means that Russia is not Europe and that European rules, values ​​and principles do not suit Russia, which will go its own way. This usually includes some form of oppressive rule at home and imperial expansion into other territories. This concept tends to be revived whenever Russia fails to become a leading power by current standards and feels the need to justify its backwardness with metaphysical theories. According to political scientist Nadezhda Arbatova, the publication of Vladimir Putin’s article “A New Integration Plan for Eurasia: The Future in Process” in Izvestia on October 3, 2011 officially marked Russia’s withdrawal from Europe and, more generally, from the West, with its nostalgia. for what he calls “traditional Russian values,” growing into an argument even in favor of an invasion of Ukraine. After all, his official adviser until 2020 (for many even now, despite his formal removal from office) Vladislav Surkov wrote in 2019 in an article entitled “Putin’s long rule” that “the multi-level political institutions adopted by the West are sometimes considered partly ceremonial, institutionalized more to be “like everyone else”, so that the differences in our political culture do not impress our neighbors so much, do not disturb or frighten them. It’s like a weekend outfit where we visit strangers, but at home we dress like we’re at home, and everyone inside knows what that means.” In June 2019, he himself, in an exclusive interview with the Financial Times, argued that the liberal idea was not only outdated, but also harmful to the interests of the vast majority of the population, which, in his opinion, wants to preserve civilization, its traditions and family values. However, as Arbatova wrote, “few people in Russia have clarified what these traditional values ​​are or what makes them characteristically Russian,” especially when you look at modern Russian Eurasians, who, if there are some true believers among them, are few, at the same time while the majority consists of cynical opportunists who want to live like Europeans, ruling like medieval Mongols.

Türkiye

And somewhere here, perhaps, it should be remembered that since the late 1990s, Eurasianism has received some resonance in Turkey, and, as many reliable media characterize, Erdogan’s informal foreign policy adviser and leader of the Vatan (Motherland) party ) Dogu Perincek, to be among the privileged interlocutors with Russian circles, if not to lead them, given that the future of Turkey lies in the rising power of “Eurasia”. Perincek stated, among other things, that “with various legal grounds, no one can defend Turkish law in the Eastern Mediterranean” to conclude that “in the Eastern Mediterranean, from now on, they will have the right to vote.” arms, army and navy. Perhaps this is what one should remind Putin’s many friends of Russian policy in Greece.