To the dismay of the secular and pro-Western segments of Turkish society, Erdogan has once again confirmed his popularity. With 49.5% of the vote, he was very close to winning from the first round. This was not expected. After 20 years in power, most polls showed that he was back, and it seemed that his invincibility was finally over.

With real inflation in the triple digits, 50,000 earthquake deaths exposing mismanagement, and firmly united opposition, economic and political conditions seemed ripe for change. Many analysts were expecting a comfortable victory for Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who ran a clean campaign, focusing on major day-to-day issues without resorting to identity politics.

Erdogan’s religious-nationalist alliance has already won a ruling majority in parliament. Kilicdaroglu has a losing streak against Erdogan. Thus, the demoralized opposition is deeply disappointed.

So what explains Erdogan’s continued popularity? The short answer is that it has the power to polarize a country. Erdogan knew his only chance of victory was to play the card of nationalism. Which he did, having conducted a negative election campaign that reached the point of unprecedented terror.

His job was made easier when the Kurdish party decided to support Kilicdaroglu instead of nominating its own candidate. The People’s Democratic Party (HDP) is a legitimate political party that condemns violence. However, Turkish nationalists see him as having close ties to terrorism.

Erdogan’s disinformation campaign constantly showed Kurdish militants defending Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy on large screens during political rallies in the heart of Anatolia. In addition to this polarizing nationalism, Erdogan has also masterfully played the religious card. He systematically represented secular opposition that was friendly to the LGBTI community and opposed to traditional family values.

Erdogan knew his only chance of victory was to play the card of nationalism. Which he did, leading an election campaign that reached unprecedented terror.

Elections in Turkey are neither free nor fair. By establishing a repressive regime and strong media hegemony, Erdogan had clear advantages over his rival. He didn’t need to steal votes. He simply relied on his propaganda machine and his unshakable connection with the conservative masses.

Moreover, Kılıçdaroğlu was probably wrong to rely too much on the economic downturn to formulate his campaign message. Yes, the Turkish economy is worried about uncontrolled inflation. However, the assumption that the decline in purchasing power would outweigh the threats to national security and identity politics raised two problems.

First, the opposition failed to understand that a trumped-up threat to national security – with warnings of imminent Kurdish autonomy – resonates with Erdogan’s nationalist religious base. The Kurdish issue is perhaps the most controversial in Turkish politics. Most Turks are concerned that the US supports Kurdish autonomy in Syria and Turkey. Therefore, Kılıçdaroğlu took a calculated risk in seeking support for Kurdish nationalism in Turkey. This was a sign of political courage and democratic maturity in the eyes of liberal Turks like myself. But liberals are a tiny group in Turkey compared to the overwhelming dominance of Turkish nationalism.

The second problem with the dominance of the economy over all other problems was that there was no economic crisis like the Great Depression. Rampant inflation is something Turks can tolerate as long as there is no massive unemployment and a major financial crisis. The Turkish economy is not in recession. Erdogan’s derided economic model is based on economic growth at any cost. He was determined to avoid high interest rates because the recession they would cause would likely ruin his chances of re-election. Instead, Erdogan has opted for a high-inflation, high-growth model in which he can still exercise economic populism by raising wages, lowering the pension threshold, and handing out financial loans to his friends.

If Erdogan wins, there will be more political repression and populist nationalism in the country in the next five years. Relations with the West are unlikely to improve unless the economy collapses and Erdogan has to turn to the IMF for help. Despite all the upcoming challenges, the opposition must not give up. Erdogan is not expected to run for another term. He is overtired and his health is said to have failed. Turkish democracy will live on as long as elections continue to determine winners and losers.

Erdogan proves once again that he wins elections very well, even when the odds are against him. He doesn’t need to “steal” votes. His repressive political system, populist nationalism, and conservative masses work in his favor even as the economy suffers from his mismanagement.

Mr. Omer Taspinar is Professor of Homeland Security at the National Defense University in Washington DC and the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.