As the Ukrainian counteroffensive is being prepared, several scenarios for the outcome of the war are being worked out. The NATO alliance believes that peace talks and a ceasefire in the current conditions will harm Ukraine, as they will give Russia control over the Donbass, Crimea and the southern coast of the country.

The problem is that as long as Vladimir Putin remains in power, any compromises and truces will give Russia a welcome reprieve. This means that any agreement must contain reliable security guarantees for Ukraine. Mere commitments on the part of the Western powers are no longer enough. Such commitments were also made in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which persuaded Ukraine to surrender its nuclear weapons with promises to respect its territorial integrity. These commitments were violated by Russia, as well as by Kyiv’s Western supporters. Today, only NATO membership, with the guarantees offered by Article 5 of its charter, can dissuade Russia from any future intrigues against Ukraine.

Conditions

However, Russia and NATO allies are not ready to accept this request from Kyiv, despite the outbreak of the largest war in Europe since 1945. Such a development of events will become possible, however, probably at the end of 2023.

Ukraine’s NATO candidacy will only be possible if a Ukrainian counter-offensive allows the return of critical territory. These lands are not the Donbas region on the border with Russia in the east, but two regions in the south of the country: Kherson and Zaporozhye, on the Black Sea coast. This area is the best trump card of Kyiv for three reasons.

First, Ukraine will not be able to survive economically without the ports of the Sea of ​​Azov, fertile territories and industries around them. Ukraine has been a major exporter of fertilizers, grains and other products from the region and is in desperate need of access to the sea.

Second, many Ukrainians remain stranded in these areas currently held by the Russians. Every day the Russian occupation authorities arrest dissidents, evacuate villages and spread their nationalist propaganda among the population.

The third reason is strategic. If Ukraine liberates the rest of the Kherson region, it will cut off the Crimean supply line. It will seize the railway line connecting Crimea with central Russia and threaten the Kerch Bridge, which will be within range of HIMARS systems. Ukrainians will also be able to cut off the supply of drinking water to the Crimean peninsula, and Russian artillery will retreat and stop terrorizing Ukrainians. While a Ukrainian invasion of Crimea would be very difficult due to the narrow isthmus connecting it to the mainland, blocking it would be relatively easy and operationally beneficial.

The return of the rest of Donbas ranks lower among the strategic priorities. The region has an extensive border with Russia, which makes it particularly difficult to occupy and resupply. “Oblasts” (regions) were liberated from Ukrainian residents, and even if conquered, the integration of Donbass into the Ukrainian nation will resemble the embrace of a hornet’s nest. It would be better if the huge costs of restoring the Donbass fell on the shoulders of Russia. While officially no Ukrainian government will ever give up Donbass, it can guarantee that it will not try to take it back.

The candidacy for membership in the North Atlantic Alliance will become possible only if Kyiv regains Kherson and Zaporozhye.

It is quite possible that the Ukrainian counter-offensive will be crowned with brilliant success, and we will see the weakened Russian forces collapse along the entire front. However, a more conservative and plausible scenario suggests that Ukraine will regain Kherson and Zaporozhye by the end of the summer. The threat of a slow suffocation of Crimea could give Putin an incentive to stop rocket attacks on Ukrainian cities.

However, the viability of such an agreement will depend on Ukraine’s accession to NATO. So far, the objections to the candidacy are justified, since Ukraine’s entry would drag NATO into an already existing acute conflict. In the event of a ceasefire, and if Ukraine tacitly agrees not to claim further territory, NATO can fulfill its mission as a defensive alliance. Fears that the accession of Ukraine will provoke Russia have passed, and the member states of the Alliance may send their troops to Ukraine.

A long-term ceasefire is not a utopia for Ukraine. Similar agreements are in force today between North and South Korea, which, while formally remaining at war, respect the 1954 armistice. The same is true between Greece and Turkey, which did not sign a formal peace agreement on Cyprus without breaking the peace.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that the Alliance agrees with the accession of Ukraine if a peace agreement is signed. His intentions are good, but the ceasefire will not be sustainable without Ukraine joining NATO.

One way

This scenario, in my opinion, is the only possible way to end the war within this year. However, this depends on the success of the long-awaited Ukrainian counter-offensive. If the front line of late summer fighting is anywhere near where it is now, then I fear that Western support for Ukraine will begin to wane and the possibility of a lasting ceasefire will disappear.

We must begin to develop plans for the conditions that will allow NATO to accept Ukraine into its ranks, and actively prepare for this prospect. This planning must begin now, because all of us in the West are still far from agreeing on this issue.

Mr. Francis Fukuyama is the author and director of the International Studies Program at Stanford University.