A deep economic crisis was not enough. Not even wear and tear from 20 years in power. Even the adverse effects of a devastating earthquake before the elections could not threaten his rule. The question is how and why? Phenomenon Erdogan In the light of an authoritarian populist government, Albright Stonebridge Group Senior Advisor Hakan Akbas and Center for American Progress Senior Fellow on National Security and International Policy Alan Makowski analyze in “K”.

Khakan Akbas

Senior Advisor, Albright Stonebridge Group

Erdogan has been in power for over 20 years, accumulating power without institutional checks and balances. He politicized the judiciary, which he used as a weapon against his political opponents. He has established unprecedented control over the media and the press, even over popular social networks such as Twitter. He used public resources to support insane populist promises—early retirements for about two million people, a doubling of the minimum wage, free gas for households, funding for major reconstruction projects in the earthquake zone, massive consumer loans for small and medium-sized businesses, and large projects.

Erdogan has turned Turkey into a regional power, growing in importance from Syria to Libya to Ukraine. He has capitalized on growing nationalism among young voters by introducing drone programs as well as campaigns based on the defense industry and Turkey’s first locally produced Togg electric car.

He himself is talented in political campaigns. The masses adore him at rallies. He thrives on culture wars and divisive, polarized rhetoric based on fear, which has always helped him consolidate and mobilize his voter base. It is no coincidence that he ended his campaign by reciting the Holy Quran while praying with the crowd at Hagia Sophia.

He also knows how to “read” voters’ emotions and how to get rid of political enemies (see Demirtas, Imamoglu), damage the opposition (eg Inze) and “capture” voters. Significantly, the MHP partner doubled its number compared to 2018. Even when voters punished Erdogan’s party, they remained in the alliance, voting for the nationalist MHP or the religious conservative YRP or even the HÜDA PAR, popular among conservative Kurdish voters.

Alan Makovsky

Senior Fellow, National Security and International Policy, Center for American Progress

Four factors led to Erdogan’s dominance. For interested voters, this data outweighs the financial crisis they are facing. Specifically:

• religious support. About 25% of the population consider him a hero and are ready to blindly follow him just for what he did to improve the rights and self-respect of the religious community.
• nationalist pride. He won over the Nationalists in several ways: he pursued a strong, independent foreign policy. This enhances Turkey’s prestige as a regional power. It is promoting the Turkish military industry, led by armed TB2 drones, which are said to have been ordered by more than a dozen countries.
• Negative campaigning, demonization of the opposition. He presents it as PKK- and LGBTQ-friendly, Western-aligned, and completely outside of mainstream Turkish values. It demonizes not only the opposition, but also Kurdish citizens, LGBTQ citizens and the secular community. This strategy has particular resonance in the Sunni central region of Anatolia.
• government generosity. It has repeatedly raised the minimum wage three times in the past year. He lowered the retirement age for civil servants and promised all Turks a free supply of natural gas from the Black Sea fields.

However, the AKP lost seven points from the previous election to around 35%, the lowest since 2002. In addition, Erdogan was forced to participate in the second round of presidential elections for the first time. So there are warning signs of deteriorating support on his face.