The prospect of elections in the country has caused discussions, initiatives and disputes over the institutional mechanisms for protecting democracy from the participation of specific individuals or political forces in the electoral process. The dangers of democracy are at the forefront of not only national but international concern today. However, the most important way to protect democracy is not to need protection, that is, not to go so far as to seek salvation in people or in special events. The defense of democracy depends on respect for its functioning, its institutions, the solution of issues of concern to citizens, and, in particular, the social, economic, political and other results produced by the policies and behavior of bodies, institutions, individuals. If, in practice, these results diverge significantly from society’s expectations of its political system, no amount of institutional prohibitions will protect the state. Values ​​and principles risk being relegated to the background, as has often been the case when difficult situations, crises, setbacks or bad policies drag down important relationships (e.g. social justice, work, income, rule of law, inequality, violence, uncertainty, sense of security). etc.), which, dominating words, were betrayed by reality. When such strong currents of rivalry formed in history, no institutional intervention prevented the overthrow or mutation of democracy and the rise to power of all forms of dictatorial or authoritarian regimes.

We faced this danger in Greece in the 2010s, it’s good to say that democracy has survived. He did endure, but at a high cost. In the years that followed the manifestation of the consequences of the economic crisis of 2009, at the cost of huge human losses, not only fundamental economic, social and political balances were upset. Disturbed party and inter-party balances were not the most important. Our post-political democracy was on a razor’s edge, and it became clear to what extent political forces and the whole world, knowingly or unconsciously placing themselves in a democratic space, acted in a way that seriously endangered democracy and its basic rules of organization. and the functioning of our political system.

Support for democracy certainly presupposes a strong institutional framework. However, defense involves something much more significant on two levels: the formation of attitudes and events that will convince the citizen that the institutions of democratic functioning should have a critical weight in his system of values ​​and principles, and on the other hand, the results obtained by this system, are important and represent long-term gains, struggles and processes that should not be lost.

Democracy, like any state, is associated with values ​​and shortcomings. The weight of each value, such as economic success, political, social and individual rights, cultural elements, etc. for a society is co-determined by all the other values ​​and real situations of which it is composed. For a citizen, this has a different weight; the value of democracy when it prevents painful situations and offers improved living conditions and other burdens if it does not meet basic social expectations.

This means that values ​​and principles are only part of the narrative. The second part concerns the results that the democratic state produces, by means of which it must demonstrate in practice its superiority over authoritarianism or absolutism. Major shocks of an economic, social or political nature, such as those that occurred in 2009 and later in Greece, or those that occurred in the US or the UK, strike at the very heart of democracy and directly affect the degree of collective trust and support for the state. Either because the causal relationship between politics and failure is real, or because broader social strata even form misconceptions, political choices that undermine the credibility of the state are questioned. These doubts become especially strong when, as Tasos Papadopoulos would say, the social expectations created by the political system are turned upside down with a bang. Events of this kind are primarily related to the governance of the country – the choice of the elites, which Martin Wolf mentions in his latest book – but not only. It is a common mode of action of the main actors of the state (government, parties, elites, individuals, leadership, social organizations, collective behavior) that jointly determines the result and causes members of society to fight or distance themselves from democratic forms of government. Democracy requires constant and consistent adoption and practical observance of forms of functioning that will not undermine it for the sake of personal, party or any other goals.

In the 2010s, the whole world, positioning itself in a democratic space, willingly or unwittingly threatened democracy and the basic rules of our political system.

Our century has an extremely important, new and dystopian feature: it is now faced with a large number of parallel global and collective threats. The creation and coexistence of many important threats and uncertainties creates new conditions for the functioning of democracy and the economy, as well as new forms of destabilization. Globally, crises are becoming more frequent and intense. We are once again in conditions that signal a rapid paradigm shift and transition to a new order of things. Under these conditions, governments and parties have an additional triple responsibility: to act in a way that does not lead to the destabilization of society, to face new risks for which they are not responsible, but not to avoid being held accountable to society for their manipulations and to ensure the development process. in new, more complex and demanding conditions.

The great threat of climate change and its consequences, combined with other developments mentioned, show that social protection is likely to be increasingly linked not to monetary but to physical dimensions: strengthening protection against the climate crisis and pandemics, natural disasters, hot or cold wars. Large-scale investments in knowledge and action, as well as policies to mitigate or prevent such consequences, will have a much greater social significance for the general public than the known policy of income redistribution.

In conclusion, the current scenario shows that in many countries there is a strong causal relationship, starting with the economy destabilizing democracy. But let’s not confuse things. Causality is bidirectional. The serious economic and other problems of which I have spoken are often the result of poor policy choices or their failure to eliminate or limit phenomena such as corruption, the weakening of the welfare state, unequal taxation, the uncontrolled functioning of markets, the erosion of institutions, the control of private energy poles, and the concentration economic power on a global and national scale. Any failure by politicians to properly assess the seriousness of the problems or develop policies more compatible with changes in the international and national environment can become a secondary threat to democracy itself. Moreover, the failure of politics to respond to the perceptions and expectations – realistic or utopian – of the broader layers, which it often provokes itself, leads to doubts or even political upheavals. Faced with the cost pressures of solving multiple problems, most societies today go through a cycle of looking for fanciful solutions, cultivating unrealistic expectations, and refusing to face the truth, combined with increased authoritarianism, before perhaps again shifting towards more efficient and durable forms of government.

In current conditions and perspectives, if society instead of striving for a critical degree of internal cohesion is characterized by tendencies towards polarization and fragmentation, the risks to democracy, economic prosperity, social order and the costs of the weak increase exponentially. If indeed potential threats become a reality, then the answers may be related to hot or cold, internal or international conflicts. Based on the foregoing, the big question is how we break this circular interaction in order to prevent its extremely negative consequences in time, as well as how we organize an effective policy for a real, even if incomplete, treatment of our multiple collective. problems between which change the crisis.

Mr. Thassos Giannitsis is a former minister.