Can information shape the battlefield or prevent war? In the case of Ukraine, the provision of strategic information by the “Western” alliance allowed Kyiv to make responsible decisions and launch strategic strikes against the numerically superior Russian forces. In this context, former U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) commander and U.S. Jewish Institute of Homeland Security (JINSA) analyst General Robert Ashley explains to “K” the backstory of the Russian invasion, “false flag” and “reflexive control” techniques, and dispersive war scenarios.

– When I think about Putin’s strategies to mislead foreign intelligence agencies, it seems to me that we have misled ourselves. Going back to 2007, Putin was very blunt when he made the comment to then President Bush. “Ukraine is not a country,” he said. So this narrative that Ukraine is not a country is not new. This is what he has been saying for over a decade. In addition, this opinion was reflected in his actions based on the events in Crimea in 2014, as well as in Georgia in 2008. So we have misled ourselves, and part of the problem lies in the actions we have taken.

We often tend to observe the actions of a foreign leader and look at his behavior through the lens of the West. So we just sit and watch and say, “What is the probability that he will do this?” I spoke to people who were experts on Russia, who had a lot of experience, to various think tanks that exist in Washington. No one thought it made sense, and they backed up that view with data that took economic implications into account. Thus, they did not pay much attention to the actual data.

Putin interpreted the West’s inaction and mild reaction to the war in Georgia and the takeover of Crimea as a sign of decline. The Kremlin assessed that Ukraine was not of strategic interest to the West, so Putin was of the opinion that there would be no military action or significant response from the West if he did try to invade. The bottom line was to withstand any financial impact.

–​​​​​​​​In the information industry, there are enterprises operating under a false flag. This is a tactic where you assign your action to the opponent and then refer to it as the reason for the action. In the case of Ukraine, about a month before the war, the intelligence community predicted these false flag operations: according to the scenarios, Moscow planned to send agents to Ukraine to strike at objects representing Russian interests. That would be the alibi the Kremlin was looking for.

It is a fact that we had information about the intrusion, and we disclosed it in mid-January (a month ago), when we began to receive more specific reports. Now we have been able to warn the Russians, based on the doctrine of deterrence, that we know their plans, as well as the Ukrainians and President Zelensky.

The further in time you are from the event, the more ambiguous the estimates. However, as the critical moment approaches, the signs become much more specific. We are starting to see the “false flags” more clearly.

–​​​​​​​​ Let’s return to the discussion of false flag operations. One way to prevent this is to publicize the opponent’s plans. Here’s how it happened in this case. The revelation of the Kremlin’s plans was used as a deterrent, and the message was clear: “Look, we know you’re coming, there will be consequences.” You must be clear in the message you send.

In the case of Ukraine, within 60 days of the start of the war, we carried out another deception operation using chemical weapons. The Russians said that “the Americans and Ukrainians are going to use chemical weapons.” This “false flag” was used with the logic that since they can do it, we will expose it and make it public, acting as a deterrent to any use of chemical weapons that the Russians could ever imagine.

– I think it’s a combination of both. When you look at the complexity of war, there are so many things that go into it. There is a human factor, there is right or wrong training, there is morale, there are technological factors, that is, who has the best equipment. Logistics factors in terms of the ability to restock and maintain a seamless supply chain. So I think all of that plays a role.

What hinders the Russians the most is the human factor. Continued losses are forcing Moscow to throw conscripts into battle due to a lack of experienced personnel. This factor gradually weakens the ability of the Russian troops to act and have a high morale to advance on the battlefield. The complete opposite of what we see on the Ukrainian side. Ukrainians have much higher morale and stronger motivation because they are defending their homeland.

In addition, from a certain point on, ammunition and the ability to supply the forces operating at the front become decisive. We see the Russians decommission the T-54/T-55 tanks that have been in service since the end of World War II. They receive drones from Iran, as well as ammunition from North Korea. So they are running out of stock. This logistical weakness eventually becomes another critical factor.

On the other hand, I think the most important point is how it will play out at the level of individual soldiers. It is clear that Putin does not care about losses. They will send even more soldiers to the front line without worrying about the lives lost. I think at some point all these factors will have a cumulative effect. But this will take time.

The Balkans want to cut off the road to NATO

“I think the Russians want to complicate American military doctrine wherever they can. We evaluate this in the context of posing a lot of dilemmas to the enemy. So, in this context, when we talk about the Balkans or the Middle East, areas where Russia can create a lot of military dilemmas, for the West, the situation becomes problematic.

It is clear that Russia has deep interests in Serbia. They did their best to bring the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina back into their sphere of influence and convince it to withdraw from the union formed after the war in the Balkans. And so they are always moving in multiple and parallel realms, trying to create additional dilemmas for the US. Could this lead to a military conflict? I don’t think this is a continuation of what is happening in Ukraine. It is natural, where they have an interest, to try to ensure that the Balkan countries do not unite or go down the path towards NATO membership.

Returning to my comment about the Russian doctrine, they will try to create dilemmas for the US and involve some third countries in their sphere of influence. This will be done either with the use of force or with the help of diplomatic, military or economic intelligence.

What Russia and China are after is to overthrow the world order that has existed since World War II and turn it into a more favorable situation for them. By creating this other class of rules, they could extend their influence to other emerging authoritarian countries.

Leading the enemy

“Reflexive control” is a type of intelligence operation. This is my way of feeding you information in such a way that you choose the course of action I desire. I urge you to do what I want, but you think that this is your decision and that this course of action is in your interests, when in fact the opposite is true. “Reflexive control” is something that goes back 3 or 4 decades.

I think one of the best examples in terms of trying to influence is the 2016 election when they tried to use bots, disinformation and various information campaigns to get the American population to act in a certain way and in some cases divide us, i.e. the question “who are we as a nation?”. I think this is a good example of “reflexive control”.