By the end of 2023, the institutions of the European Union (EU) must make sensitive decisions regarding the prospects of the pre-accession dialogue with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The outcome of these decisions is unknown and depends on the assessment of progress made by the European Commission. However, Brussels exhibitors openly demonstrate their geopolitical sympathies and, accordingly, their attachment to the Ukrainian and Moldovan files. The diametrically opposite situation is observed in the case of Georgia, especially against the background of deteriorating relations between the authorities and civil society and mass media. During the critical analysis of the reforms in the three EU countries, different achievements will be identified. But this is still not enough to approve the start of negotiations (Ukraine and Moldova) or the granting of candidate country status (Georgia) in 2023.

The uncertainty associated with the results of the elections to the European Parliament in 2024 and, accordingly, the future composition of the European Commission would contribute to the idea of ​​starting negotiations on the accession of Ukraine and Moldova. Thus, Georgia will be finally separated from the “package” approach to the Ukraine-Moldova tandem. The interpersonal and political relationships of the current EU leadership allow for a significant degree of subjectivity in assessing progress. To a large extent, Russia’s war against Ukraine and the chain negative consequences for Moldova reduce the EU’s demandingness. It is on these geopolitical circumstances that the political leadership of Kyiv and Chisinau is counting on their approach to the start of negotiations by the end of 2023. As a rule, the EU refers to the meritocratic principle, but the application of this principle strictly speaking this could push back the timetable for the start of accession talks to 2024 or even later.

EU demands for deepening pre-accession dialogue are met with speed and quality that vary from one country to another (BNE, February 2023). In the case of Ukraine, problems are planned in connection with various aspects of 7 EU requirements. It is about the reform of the Constitutional Court, the fight against corruption and legislation on national minorities. Moldova’s progress is uneven and politicized in some aspects. The Venice Commission and the pro-reform opposition noted problems related to judicial reform and the expansion of the powers of special services, which pose a risk to human rights. In any case, the EU has not expressed public concern about any deviations from the fulfillment of the 9 demands put forward to Moldova. In Georgia, the authorities report high progress in fulfilling the 12 conditions, while opposition forces, civil society, and critical media blame the impossibility of overcoming “political polarization.”

The EU is due to assess progress in the spring and summer by publishing reports on all countries included in the “enlargement package” in October 2023 (10 countries in total). The conclusions of the Commission may later be used by other EU institutions to recommend the start of negotiations on the accession of Ukraine and Moldova and/or the granting of candidacy to Georgia.

Ukraine is between a protracted war and unfinished reforms

In the context of Russian aggression, the promotion of the pre-accession dialogue with the EU is a strategic priority for maintaining the socio-political unity of Ukraine in good shape. Like solidarity around protection against revanchist Russia, Ukraine needs support in the field of European integration. Tiredness from the Ukrainian topic in Europe in general is a well-founded fear. As the war enters its second year, its cost is the mobilization of pacifist protests in the West and conciliatory diplomatic initiatives in the Global South that serve Russian interests. In this context, the fulfillment of EU conditions and the possible start of accession negotiations will be a strong political incentive to combine the continuation of reforms with the military counteroffensive planned for the coming months.

At the beginning of February, Ukrainian civil society assessed the progress in fulfilling EU conditions at 5.8 out of 10 points (Evropeyska Pravda, February 2023). The reform of the Constitutional Court, legislation on combating money laundering and the law on deoligarization were recognized as the most problematic areas of reform. Despite the fact that legislation on national minorities is considered to have been achieved, the lack of concrete action to solve the problems of the Hungarian and Romanian sides may resurface later. Other assessments show that none of the 7 conditions are fully met. Among the most significant shortcomings can be named: 1) prevention of blockages and politicization in the appointment of constitutional judges; 2) completion of appointment of members of the High Qualification Commission of Judges; 3) resumption of the procedure for assessing income declarations suspended in 2022; 4) adoption of the other three laws out of 6, which relate to combating money laundering; 5) revision of the law on deoligarization in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission (EPC, March 2023).

The Ukrainian government is convinced that Ukraine will complete the fulfillment of the 7 conditions by June, and by then will fulfill other aspects. There is close cooperation with the Venice Commission and the European institutions to find solutions that will allow the conditions to be met. An example is the idea that the votes of representatives of external partners in the body for the selection of constitutional judges (the Advisory Group of Experts) should prevail over the votes of Ukrainian members (Euroactiv, March 2023).

Moldova – crisis surrounding judicial reform and new risks for human rights

One of the main goals of the government is to open negotiations on joining the EU as early as 2023, with further accession to the EU by 2030. The lack of a realistic approach on the part of the government of Moldova means that the reforms are rushed, including allowing deviations from constitutional principles (separation of power in the state, etc.). The government intended to complete the implementation of EU conditions by the end of March, but did not achieve this goal. Subsequently, the Moldovan authorities moved the deadline to the end of April, which is also an overly optimistic political calendar and is not tied to existing national technical-legal procedures. To overcome legal obstacles, the executive and parliamentary majority, led by the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), are calling for a state of emergency in the field of national security. Since February 2022, the government has already extended the state of emergency seven times and extended exceptional powers, contrary to legal restrictions, including on judicial reform.

The biggest obstacle in the fulfillment of EU requirements is the situation in the field of justice, namely the filling of all vacant positions in the Higher Council of Magistracy (HCM). Without this body, the third power in the state – the judiciary – cannot govern itself, and is therefore dysfunctional. The government accuses the judges of obstructing the appointment of a new member of the Supreme Court. In 2019-2021, the General Meeting of Judges was unable to elect a new composition of the Supreme Court of Justice. Experts in the field indicate that the reasons for this delay are related to political pressure or pandemic restrictions, as well as the lack of a quorum. The old composition of SCM comes from the period of oligarchic power (2015-2019). A functional and legitimate SCJ requires 12 members, including 6 judges and 6 non-judges. Based on the evaluations of the previous review commission, with financial support including European partners, 5 judges (out of 28) and 3 non-judges (out of 12) were selected. In order to avoid guilty verdicts at the ECtHR due to ignoring the appeals of judges who did not pass the certification of the SCSU, the General Assembly of Judges proposed to postpone the appointment of judges to the new SCM until the end of April. Consequently, the new SCM currently consists of only three non-judges from civil society, who were voted in by the ruling party, and one judge from the previous composition with a temporary mandate. The EU has confirmed very clearly that cleaning up the judicial system is a must (RadioMoldova, April 2023), and the CSM is the first step in this direction. The impasse surrounding the Supreme Court of Justice will call into question the legality of decisions made in an incomplete composition dominated by non-judges. Currently, justice reform is experiencing an acute crisis. Political pressure on judges to de-corrupt the system creates risky precedents for the sustainability of judicial reform.

In addition to failings to meet EU justice requirements, further human rights setbacks could result from the government’s legislative initiative to expand the powers of the Intelligence and Security Service (SIS). A parliamentary majority voted in first reading on a package of laws that would allow intelligence agencies to intercept and access virtually any personal data without the need for court approval. The Venice Commission noted that the proposed legislation is imperfect and creates numerous risks for human rights (privacy, personal data, freedom of expression, etc.). Despite President Maia Sandu calling for an urgent vote on a law to prevent Russian subversion in Moldova, the parliamentary majority has promised to launch public consultations. Ignoring the Venice Commission will turn the SIS into a state within a state, with dire consequences for the protection of fundamental freedoms, meaning non-compliance with EU 9 requirements.

Georgia – problematic reforms and a crisis of the government’s image

The main problem of Georgia is the crisis of image and trust in the ruling party (“Georgian Dream”). Non-integration of civil society in reform processes and attacks on it – at the level of rhetoric and politics (the draft law on foreign agents, withdrawn after protests) – is the government’s biggest backlog. Of the 12 requirements of the EU, the cooperation of civil authorities with civil society in Georgia is practically absent. Likewise, “political polarization” is irresistible as long as state institutions are politicized and do not provide a level playing field for all political forces. “Polarization” is a symptom, not the root of the problem.

In Brussels, it was noted that EU requirements can be implemented only with the participation of the Georgian government and parliament. However, this does not exclude the importance of other actors, such as the opposition or civil society, without which it is impossible to ensure a balance of interests during the implementation of reforms required by European institutions. The EU is ready to provide the necessary assistance to Georgia to fulfill the conditions. The deadline set by the “Georgian Dream” is the end of June (Agenda.ge, March 2023), and the opposition is threatening anti-government protests if the EU conditions are not met by April.

Reforms in the judicial system or the law on deoligarization, as in the case of Ukraine and Moldova, require the implementation of the recommendations of the Venice Commission. However, in the absence of this prerequisite, the measures taken will be considered as not meeting European requirements. Achieving reforms within three months, by the time the European Commission prepares a preliminary assessment of progress, is an ambitious goal. Even if the government succeeds, it also needs to detoxify its public image. In this sense, the ruling party should give up disparaging discourse about European politicians and institutions. Due to the Eurosceptic rhetoric of the authorities, Georgia is losing friends in the EU, instead of increasing them, following the example of Ukraine and Moldova. If the deadlock is not overcome, the EU may leave Georgia in the category of potential candidates until 2025, pending the results of parliamentary elections in autumn 2024. Read the entire article and leave comments on Contributors.ro