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For the new defense economy

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For the new defense economy

“so that your interest is born from every word”

(Demosthenes, Olynthes I)

The upcoming elections are an opportunity to present and evaluate proposals for correcting identified shortcomings and for the necessary adaptation of our defense system to the challenges of our geopolitical horizon. An example of the quality of a state is the ability to have a meaningful dialogue – and commitment to the implementation of the chosen options – on the main parameters of creating, functioning and managing a defense system. Dialogue must be inclusive, the only criterion of truth is the most beneficial for the nation.

Today there is no place for personal plans or convenient automation, not to mention non-critical, often outdated and incorrect transfers of borrowed experience. The society itself, which finances the defense and staffs it with its children, makes quality demands on its officers. And as we have tragically seen lately, she will not forgive any short-sightedness, incompetence or deceit, even when she herself has long turned a blind eye to the microscale of self-interest.

Therefore, the starting point of any proposal should be the recognition of the mistakes made. If we’re doing everything right, how did we end up in this situation? If we don’t have to change anything, how can we hope to succeed in a world that is changing before our eyes? After all, is it possible to prepare us for 2030, when the favorite recipe for delayed and piecemeal interventions in a variety of issues, from personnel to equipment issues, has already led to a dead end today?

The main questions on which we expect to evaluate effective political positions relate to three aspects: economic (operational budget and budget for development), results mechanisms (use of personnel, command and control of the armed forces, transformation of the potential of available resources into results based on an agreed mission , innovation) and political operational control (accountability and accountability).

The scale of the problems that have accumulated over decades in the defense system require its radical restructuring. The situation gave us some time to correct the weaknesses. But it won’t last forever. Macro indicators are not favorable for us, especially if we look at absolute economic indicators, demographics (an aging and declining population), a lag in the transfer of best practices to the defense system, and a shortage of national electricity generation.

The above issues look mainly in the defense system. Added to this is the constant strategic threat from the neighbor, despite the ups and downs of tension. Equally, the environment must be taken into account. I don’t know anyone who possesses a crystal ball with predictive powers, but I am sure that the increased ability to perceive convergence and divergence in time with our own strategic and tactical choices of other actors should arise as an opportunity for internal reorganization. The role of the National Security Council is also important in this direction.

A reassessment of the overall financial performance of the defense system by parliament over time will allow us to confirm that we can bridge the gap between our political goals (and therefore missions) and their actual support. As is the case today, the gap is widening. Dealing with both sides of a problem is a highly political function and should not be left solely to the (usually out of touch) bureaucracy. Maintaining systems that offer little can incur costs that deprive you of new opportunities. Every euro spent on super-old submarines is one euro less for the most modern ones. Many did not understand (or did not want to understand) the option “we must shrink in order to grow.” Opportunities that arise as a need do not develop because we are stuck in supporting opportunities that will not contribute to the development of the field.

Maintaining systems that offer little can incur costs that deprive you of new opportunities.

The problems faced by the staff (and there are many) also need political underpinnings for their solution. “Blowing the county” with valuations (a vacuum of substance), money (benefits), and opportunistic flattering of sycophants at the expense of others is never politics. Especially for our navy, the level of retirements of active officers with a significant expected offer should have already been taken into account by the state. What are we doing to attract and retain the best leaders? The lack of ethics in the choice of personnel policy has a direct negative impact on our efficiency. We haven’t invested experience and skill in senior officers and other wiggle room to get sidelined because they have an opinion or an Arvan head or they don’t know how to flatter.

The adjustment of the command and control structure of the armed forces suggests that we shape the relationship (sharing of projects and responsibilities) between the Ministry and GHETHA, the relationship between GHETHA and Chapters, and the abolition of the absolute and ineffective competence of A / GETA in matters that are better served by Chapters, or dangerous even for the state itself to be concentrated in one person, without checks and balances. This is becoming more necessary than the practice applied in recent years in our daily work. Our age requires a dialogue bank for synthesis, not “decide and command”.

Defense resources will never be sufficient to meet all needs. Thus, constant monitoring of ROI rates becomes vital. Always within the framework of politically defined missions. A lot can be done so that even what is there takes up more space. From financial and administrative measures to the selection of personnel for special positions. Each of our choices has an imprint on the future in euros and the result. It is not clear how we prefer not to hire ten people, but choose an expensive and unreliable (in terms of delivery time and quality of work) subcontracting the maintenance of the x or ψ system, losing know-how along the way. Should we or shouldn’t we decide as a system what should organically stay mine, what can I share as a project, and what can I fully delegate outside of my structure?

Many theorists have approached war (destruction, violence) as the opposite of production (creation). They argue that as societies create, they destroy (forgive the simplicity of the metaphor). If today we see production and its characteristics, we will understand how much our defense system lags behind them. Innovation, artificial intelligence, robotics, quantum computing and many other buzzwords. An example from P.N. Over time, the arrival of newly built units became the reason for the total modernization of P.N. not only performance. With those that were planned, have we planned the appropriate benefit? Or are we still thinking about the doctrines and support of the last century? Human capital comes here to play its vital role. How will I combine new skills with age-old demands for fortitude, energy and initiative in the development of our employees? Especially for sea power: have we even touched on the synergy that we can achieve between sea and naval power? Training, support, evaluation and planning come to mind automatically.

The question of the degree of involvement of the political leadership in “technocratic” decisions does not have an unambiguous answer at all times, in all latitudes and latitudes of the globe, in all states and security situations.

But we will not be mistaken if we increase the visibility of the state in the work of the defense system. Summons to a competent parliamentary committee up to the level of a major administration, ensuring the effective functioning of collective institutions through the registration of dissenting opinions, substantial control and accountability of those who play a certain role should be taken for granted. I remember that in Somalia, next to a German frigate, as part of an operation against piracy (EU), a visit by a delegation of a committee of the German parliament was intercepted in order to form their own opinion. I can’t remember a similar experience in the country.

Protection concerns all of us. And, of course, every day something is done to strengthen it. However, we are once again in a period of significant changes in the environment and due to increased quality demands from the municipality to the decision makers. It would be a mistake to take the view that defense issues are not “touchable” and that there is no room for dialogue.

This point of view has led to a deficit of results. Again, the environment will not forgive such a shortage. As Isocrates points out: it is in the interest of the Greeks to be persuasive, but it is useful to attack the barbarians.

Mr. Panagiotis Limberis is the Honorary Fleet Commander.

Author: PANAGIOTIS LIMPERIS

Source: Kathimerini

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