Turkey’s May elections are taking place in a context that Erdogan and his supporters could not have imagined just a month ago. The president is no longer the favorite to win, and his political future is in question. In a decisive election that will either confirm a presidential system a la Turka or pave the way back to parliamentary democracy, the winds of political change are now blowing in the neighboring country.

Considering who his main adversary is and his stamina in Turkish politics, the above assessment seems overly bold. For the past 21 years, the Turkish political arena has been dominated by the president, and this long period is divided into two sub-periods. The first decade was a reformist one: with the West as a backbone and a small but seething liberal intelligentsia at home, Erdogan broke foreign policy taboos and reformed the state in the name of democracy and justice. In the second decade of his life, he made his own reversal: supported by the Muslim world (inside and outside the walls), as a courageous leader opposed to the “racism” of the West, Erdogan became identified with the extreme nationalist and religious forces. What has remained unchanged for two decades is the support of the majority of the population, even as the elections became less and less fair. As (fragile but real) prosperity spread and Turkey slowly became a regional power to be reckoned with, now led by its visionary leader rather than at the behest of the IMF or other “foreign powers”, the Turks ignored the leader’s growing authoritarianism, polarizing rhetoric and his “divide and conquer” logic, which he applied with great success. Moreover, the opposition has fared even worse: the leader of the main opposition CHP party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, has been in power since 2010 and, with the exception of the 2019 municipal elections, has never won an election. In early 2023, Erdogan was promoting a narrative of stability and tenacity, and the signs were absolutely encouraging. Hyperinflation and a deepening economic crisis have not upset the balance in a country where conservative votes make up 60%+ of the electorate. At the time, in early 2023, when Erdogan turned on the taps of state money to maintain the illusion of prosperity and please voters, the opposition unsuccessfully tried to unite around the candidate. Another electoral victory for the most popular Turkish leader since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk seemed like a matter of time.

And then there were earthquakes. The disaster was aggravated not only by the poor construction of buildings, but also by the lack of organization and coordination on the part of government agencies. This is largely the result of a capitalist model of development based on an authoritarian political structure and opaque but mutually beneficial compromises between political, media and business power. Suddenly and unexpectedly, the king was naked, and the story of a strong and powerful country fell into ruins. The government’s promises of rapid reconstruction and rehabilitation of the victims sound superficial and meaningless in the midst of the country’s worst disaster in 100 years. The fact that NGOs are at the forefront of relief efforts and trusted by millions of Turks more than government agencies speaks volumes about the failure of local government.

Erdogan is an ordinary frontline player who will use all means, honest or dishonest, to get himself re-elected.

The political consequences of the state’s lack of response to earthquakes are limited and will not lead to mass voter migration. However, this catastrophe prompted the opposition forces to unite, realizing that this is the only way they will achieve the changes that they expect and promise. Moreover, this unity is imposed from the bottom up, and not vice versa: when the leader of the Good Party left the opposition bloc that protested against the election of Kılıçdaroglu, the negative reaction, including within her own party, was so massive that it forced her to reconsider her position. The result is why I think Erdogan is closer to defeat than to victory: Kılıçdaroğlu is now the opposition candidate, and the two popular mayors of Istanbul and Ankara are his potential candidates. In addition, his meeting with representatives of the pro-Kurdish HDP party in Diyarbakır the day after the earthquakes and his general stance on democracy and individual freedoms (Kılıçdaroğlu is by far the most progressive CHP leader in its modern history) make possible his support from the HDP.

The path of change in Turkey is far from certain. At the very least, Erdogan is a political survivor and a permanent frontline player who will use all means, fair or dishonest, to secure his re-election. In them, we must take for granted his references to his opponent’s Alevi affiliation (Alevis are a liberal sect that practices gender equality and adheres to a strictly secular political position) and his willingness to accuse the opposition of terrorist influence due to the possible position of the aforementioned HDP.

In conclusion, I want to say that President Erdogan is well aware that the 2023 elections are very different from the past. Facing the threat of defeat for the first time in two decades, he will play as a substitute. Let’s get married.

Mr. Dimitris Tsarouhas is a visiting professor at the Virginia Institute of Technology in the USA and an ELIAMEP Fellow. He has been Professor of International Relations at METU and Bilkent Universities in Ankara for 17 consecutive years (2006-2023).