The anniversary of the Russian invasion has taught us not to underestimate or take Ukraine for granted. Kyiv’s resistance ran counter to those who wanted capitulation and territorial concessions, convinced that Russian power would be decisive.

An operational stalemate in late summer due to a shortage of ammunition for the Ukrainian army again led to calls from the West to end the war with territorial concessions. The American decision to increase defense assistance with HIMARS missile systems radically changed the situation on the battlefield. The Ukrainian military began shelling Russian ammunition depots, command centers, military airfields in Russia, and even the famous bridge across the Kerch Strait. Ukraine’s successes have silenced the West, calling for peace talks.

After November, the war again entered a period of apparent stagnation. After the great Ukrainian offensive in the fall, both sides needed to resupply and recuperate. In the case of Russia, this meant sending a large number of conscripts to the front lines, despite their poor training and limited weapons.

The Russian attempt to recapture Bahamut resulted in huge casualties on both sides. The Russians used convicts in this battle, who were ordered to attack the fortified positions in the forehead. Deserters were sentenced to death on the battlefield and executed with hammers to the head.

Again, the apparent stagnation at the front brought to the fore the fear of a long war and prompted new calls for some kind of peace agreement. Everything will now be decided by the assistance that each side will provide: Russia from its industrial base and its new allies (China and Iran) and Ukraine from the West.

Despite significant U.S. and Western support for Kyiv, arms advances remain painfully slow. The decision to provide modern German and American tanks, taken in January in Ramstein, should have been taken six months ago. At the same time, Republicans in the US are expected to rally around a political platform to deny further defense assistance to Ukraine ahead of the 2024 presidential election.

European assistance to Ukraine has been substantial and impressive. Europe’s mild winter and natural gas reserves avoided an energy crisis, and the war contributed to the exclusion of European energy markets from Russia.

Everything will now be decided by the assistance that each side will provide: Russia from its industrial base and its new allies (China and Iran) and Ukraine from the West.

However, the trend on both sides of the Atlantic is clear. Support for Ukraine will decline over time and will depend on developments on the battlefield. If Ukraine gives the impression that it is capable of regaining territory with the help of new Western weapons, then foreign support will continue.

Many Western analysts have fallen into unfounded pessimism, which the media is only now beginning to counteract. Let’s not forget that Russian supplies are not endless, and the recent mass mobilization shows that from September to the present, a huge number of Russian soldiers have died on the battlefields, and the total number of Russians killed and wounded since the beginning of the case has reached 200,000 people. . The British Defense Secretary recently commented that 97% of the Russian army is currently in Ukraine.

The Kremlin no longer has significant reinforcements capable of refuting the facts. It is believed that a third of Russia’s pre-war tank stocks have been destroyed or disabled, severely limiting the maneuverability of the Russian armed forces and their ability to carry out effective tank attacks with air support. According to media reports, Russian industrial production has been hit hard by conscription and a shortage of personnel. The Wagner Group, for its part, announced a suspension of the recruitment of criminals, due to the limited turnout of volunteers, who are now few, realizing that their chances of surviving on the Ukrainian front are small.

Pessimism is not justified for another reason: how little the Russian military learned from the war. Instead of planning a major offensive, the Russian command is sticking to small-scale operations on several fronts. Thus, it does not give the impression that poorly trained recruits are not capable of performing complex operations. This weakness has become evident in recent Russian attempts to capture Vulendar southwest of Bahamut. Two elite units of the Russian marines suffered huge losses during the operation: in less than two days, the Russians lost 30 tanks and lost 1,000 men killed and wounded.

The Ukrainians face a difficult but not impossible task – to return their lands. The liberation should begin from Kherson and Zaporozhye, securing the Black Sea coast. Capturing Melitopol would cut off Russian supplies to Crimea, jeopardizing Russia’s position on the annexed peninsula. This plan should have a higher priority than the reconquest of Donbass.

Despite the Kremlin’s willingness to take heavy casualties, all it takes is a persistent and successful offensive to destroy the Russian front.

Mr. Francis Fukuyama is Professor of International Relations at Stanford University and author of The End of History.