Since 1923, it was the refugees who ensured the electoral dominance of Venizelism and the Royal Republic. But ten years later, in the elections of March 5, 1933, the defection of several thousand refugees to the anti-Venizelist side was enough to finally defeat Venizelos and undermine the position of the queen. Without this apostasy, Venizelism would have maintained a comfortable parliamentary majority, and there would have been neither the 1933 movement nor the 1935 movement, and the Not-Reigning Republic itself would have been consolidated.

Pressing livelihood needs and explosive financial problems such as debts and reparations owed to them created the conditions for refugees to self-determine and advance their special interests through opportunistic or even adventurous political action. Thus, a special type of refugee statesmen was formed, who became known by the infamous nickname “refugee fathers”.

The turning point came in June 1930 when Venizelos submitted the Ankara Convention to Parliament for immediate ratification. Although most refugee MPs were reluctant to submit to Liberal Party discipline, a small group of “refugee fathers” both inside and outside Parliament severed their ties with the Liberals forever and denounced the Convention as a sale of refugee rights.

Venizelos not only defended the Convention, but also vehemently attacked the “refugee fathers” as a “threat to national unity” because they created a new gap between refugees and natives and pushed the country to the brink of civil unrest.

For his part, People’s Party leader Panagis Tsaldaris began a historic shift in his strategy by criticizing the Convention while at the same time supporting the refugees. With the acrobatics of a balancer, he denounced the settlement with Turkey both for adding to the economic burden on the natives and for ignoring the refugees’ legitimate demand for full compensation.

In the following period, party leaders began to bargain among themselves for partnerships with refugees. More aggressive was Georgios Kondilis, who, on the eve of the 1932 elections, set about creating a new emission, promising to pay 25%, allegedly withheld “temporarily”, by the National Bank when paying refugees. compensation. This promise went unnoticed in 1932. But in March 1933 it returned more acutely.

Then the Anti-Venezuelan coalition as a whole (including Kondylis) promised 25% to the “refugee brothers”. The announcement also mentions the Liberals’ emphatic statement that “no refugee is now entitled” to any amount.

Then Venizeliks and Venizelos himself made the fatal mistake of underestimating the risk of a flight of refugees. They ignored a new and decisive fact: there was no longer a government issue to contain the leaks. They themselves took care to reinforce the impression that the Royal Republic was no longer in danger. Therefore, they refused to be drawn into the same game of promises and denounced the financial irresponsibility of opponents who promised to pay an exorbitant amount during a paralyzing economic crisis.

The underestimation of risk by the Venizeliks led to disastrous consequences. Several refugees were enticed with the 25% bait to give anti-Venizelism an electoral victory. One need only look at the critical constituency of the municipality of Athens. The Venizeliks lost 20 seats out of 21 with less than 2,000 votes. Leaks of refugees were, of course, more.

So it was enough to transfer only 2,000 refugee voters from Venizelism to anti-Venizelism in order to radically change the historical development of the country (or “the course of History”, in the established expression). This was in 1933.

The culprit, of course, was the special majority system, which the Venizelians invented in 1923 and re-established in 1933, counting on another decisive victory, as in 1928. Thanks to this majority, the meager refugee movements had a disproportionate impact. The 20 seats required to form a parliamentary majority have changed hands in one constituency. Thus, the anti-Venizelians won a majority with 136 out of 248 seats. If not for the refugee drain, the Venizelians would have won a majority with 130 out of 248 seats.

As expected, the famous 25% was never paid after the anti-Venizelists came to power thanks to these leaks. Many of them turned out to be extremely short-lived. But the consequences were of course irreparable and irreversible.

Professor Giorgos T. Mavrogordatos is the author of 1915: National Division and After 1922: The Continuation of Division.