In December 2016, after the assassination of the Russian ambassador in Ankara, many political observers made gloomy predictions about Russian-Turkish relations.

The countdown to the general election has begun in Turkey. They were supposed to take place on May 14. While it is currently unclear who will be the presidential candidate, the heated rhetoric between political parties within the country suggests that the stakes in this election are too high for Turkey’s future. External monitoring of the election atmosphere in Turkey can be observed through intensive political dialogue and transmission of diplomatic messages addressed to Turkey. “In 2023, Turkey will hold the most important elections in the world,” – the headline of the Washington Post[1], because “the outcome of the elections in Turkey will shape geopolitical and economic calculations both in Washington and in Moscow, as well as in the capitals of Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa.” Even if the West could breathe easier without Erdogan, we could not say the same about Russia, because Russia is one of the countries with which Turkey has recently been conducting a very close dialogue. What role can Russia or even Putin play in the context of the elections in Turkey? Why does Putin want Erdogan to win? How could the Kremlin leader help the Ankara leader win the election? What will Russia gain from this? How can Turkish voters influence this relationship? I’ve listed some possible answers below.

A brief history of Russian-Turkish relations

The establishment of diplomatic relations between these two countries dates back to 1492, when the Russian Tsar Ivan III sent a request to Istanbul to establish diplomatic contacts with the Ottoman Porte. In 1920, Turkey recognized the USSR as a state, and the Soviet Union became the first major power to recognize the government in Ankara during the War of Independence. In the 80s, relations regarding the export of Russian gas to Turkey began. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was an intensification of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey, mutual state visits were quite frequent. Putin’s first official visit to Turkey took place in 2004, and next year Erdogan was to make his first official visit to Russia. 2008 was a turning point in the relations between Turkey and Russia. In the context of the beginning of the war in Georgia, Turkey, as in the case of Ukraine, tried to be careful in its relations with both camps of the participants in the conflict. Since the 1990s, economic, political and cultural relations have become quite dynamic, but the most important cooperation has taken place in sectors such as trade, investment and tourism.

The rise to power of the “tsar” and “sultan”

Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been in power in Turkey since 2003, first as prime minister, then since 2014 as president. Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia and was first the Prime Minister in 1999, and in 2000 he became the President of the Russian Federation. For more than 20 years, two people ruled two countries, both de jure heirs to two great empires. The style of conducting politics of the two presidents is very different. The Turkish president is a type of choleric politician, known for his pompous, pathetic speeches, often even using egregious expressions. Putin, by contrast, is a moderate politician whose monochrome speeches would not have many listeners if he were not the president of Russia.

At first glance, some would be quick to characterize these relations as relations of trust, friendship and complete mutual solidarity, but in fact these relations are quite pragmatic, based on the interests and capabilities of both countries, relations of competition, but also cooperation. As much as Russia needs Turkey, Turkey needs Russia as much. As much as Putin needs Erdogan, Erdogan needs Putin as much. For the smooth continuation of already started projects, Putin would not want a change of power in Turkey. If Erdogan loses the election, these joint projects, strongly criticized by the opposition, could be stopped or reassessed, which would not suit Russia. Russia’s promises to turn Turkey into a real hub for Russian gas and the intensification of trade and economic relations are among the main successes that the Turkish president loudly proclaims. Russia, which is increasingly marginalized and isolated at the international level, sees in relations with Turkey the only chance to avoid the imposed sanctions, a unique and safe partner through which Russia can convey its message to the world. Turkey is the only NATO country that did not join the sanctions against Russia. For this reason, and not only, these relations are not perceived well by the NATO countries. The dire economic situation in which Turkey is mentioned, with inflation of more than 80%, which has greatly impoverished the middle class, forces Erdogan to “import” money from Russia to revive the country’s financial system before the elections. Russia can influence elections in Turkey through its “army” of journalists working on Turkish soil for Kremlin-controlled media such as Sputnik. We must not forget about the Russian “army” of trolls after the US elections, whose presence was also felt in the Turkish online environment.

The elections in Turkey turned out to be quite risky for Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). Although the data of the last social survey[2] shows that the AKP remains the leader according to the preferences of Turkish voters, we must remember the fact that the general elections in Turkey will be held between two coalition parties: the People’s Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı), which includes the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP ), on the one hand, and the National Alliance (Millet İttifakı), consisting of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Party of Good (Iyi parti), the Party of Happiness (Saadet parti), the Democratic Party (DP), the Party of Democracy and Progress (DEVA ) and the Party of the Future (Gelecek parti). However, the distribution of votes by alliances shows that an alliance of opposition parties would outperform an alliance in power. It is not yet clear what electoral strategy the pro-Kurdish party HDP (People’s Democratic Party) will adopt. In addition, he is threatened with outlawing the formation, as the authorities accuse him of having direct ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

Energy measurement

The economic sector is the most important map in the relations between these two countries. Although the Turkish president recently “pleased” the domestic public with the discovery of important gas reserves in the Black Sea basin[3], this “discovery” cannot provide Turkey with full energy independence. Turkey remains one of the largest importers of Russian gas and oil, with approximately 2/3 of the natural gas consumed by Turkey coming from Russia. At the same time, Turkey wants to be an energy transit corridor for gas from the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and Russia. With these plans, Turkey aims to strengthen and expand its geopolitical and strategic role at the regional and international levels. Realization of these aspirations in practice first of all depends on having good relations with neighboring states such as Syria and Iraq, relations that do not currently exist. Relations with Iran are also not the best, as the historical rivalry between these two countries is well known. The existence of the Blue Stream gas pipeline and the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in the city of Mersin are two important cooperation projects between Turkey and Russia, which also create a certain interstate economic interdependence.

tourism

The tourism sector is one of the most important components of economic cooperation between Russia and Turkey. After the cancellation of the visa regime in 2011, Turkey became one of the most desirable vacation destinations for Russian tourists. Annually, 10% of the total number of foreign tourists who come to rest in Turkey are Russian tourists. In December 2015, the downing of a Russian plane by the Turkish military became a turning point in relations between these two countries. Mutual accusations followed, Russia introduced sanctions and restrictions, which was a real blow to Turkey’s economy. In June 2016, Erdogan had to apologize in a letter expressing his condolences for the death of Russian pilots on board the downed plane.

Regional conflicts

Although the foreign policy agenda between Russia and Turkey has many points in common, there are still regional conflicts where these two countries take different positions. The oldest dispute is the Cyprus dispute. In the past, Russia has sold Russian S-300 missiles to Greek-controlled Cyprus, much to Ankara’s displeasure. In the event of a civil war in Syria, Russia supports the regime in Damascus. The regime change of Bashar al-Assad would mean for Russia the loss of the last Russian stronghold in the Middle East and the loss of an important ally in the region. It would also mean Russia losing two permanent military bases: an air base in Latakia province and a naval base in Tartus on the Mediterranean. Turkey has from the beginning condemned the government in Damascus, which supports the Free Syrian Army, a rebel group fighting against the government army led by Bashar al-Assad. Despite the role of an active mediator, which Turkey is trying to play in the context of the war in Ukraine (you can read more about it here), it does not hesitate to openly declare its support for Ukraine and condemn the actions of Russia. Turkey sharply criticized the annexation of Crimea and the violation of the rights of the Tatar community on the peninsula. Read the article in full and comment on Contribuotrs.ro