The critical situation that arose as a result of Russian military aggression against Ukraine radically changed the European perception of the “red lines” that Russia previously claimed. On the one hand, the new vision of the EU envisages a more ambitious geopolitical behavior regarding the complementary nature of cooperation with NATO. At the same time, European strategic thinking is becoming more relaxed about the use of military tools offered to third countries to combat security threats emanating from Russia. In January 2023, after almost 11 months of war on the European continent, the EU and NATO reaffirmed a common Western security agenda. Through this mediator, the EU seeks to strengthen its aspirations for strategic autonomy, emphasizing the deepening of the strategic partnership with NATO. Unlike other crises in the past, the crisis caused by the war in Ukraine tests the quality of EU-NATO security cooperation and points to the need to expand and deepen mutual interoperability.

Both the security crisis provoked by Russia and the conventional security model already developed and applied by NATO encourage the EU to invest in its own defense capabilities, prioritizing resilience against harmful external influences (EU-NATO Declaration, January 2022). Consequently, the unbridled approach to threats of Russian origin is normalized at the level of European decision-makers. Currently, the unity of the West is materialized in the sphere of coordination of the sanctions regime and ensuring European energy security. Currently, the violation of the taboo regarding the supply of military offensive equipment to Ukraine is under pressure. Germany’s reluctance to allow the delivery of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine is the single main source of disagreement within NATO-EU (TheGuardian, January 2023). But the reputational costs of the German government will require a qualitative review of the position in the coming weeks. Previously, Ukraine managed to stimulate Western political figures to increase military aid by liberating its territories (in the Kharkiv region, the right bank of the Kherson region) and continuing the defeat of Russian troops. In order to solve the German blockade, it is extremely necessary to apply the “sandwich” tactic, which requires the synchronization of internal and external pressure. Currently, only external pressure from NATO-EU allies is visible, without any serious action within the ruling coalition (Greens) or the systemic parliamentary opposition (CDU/CSU). German resistance creates friction within the EU-NATO, creating certain uncertainties and difficulties in military planning in the process of organizing the Ukrainian counteroffensive (planned this spring).

From the point of view of achieving comprehensive Western synchronization in the field of security with the creation of a common front against Russia, the EU is rapidly getting rid of at least three geopolitical taboos: 1) the fear of challenging Russian geopolitical hegemony in Eastern Europe; 2) strategic disinterest in entering the “intimate” zone of geopolitical influence of Russia (states that are part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization); 3) non-involvement of the military in security crises directed against Russian geostrategic interests.

Taboo No. 1: Challenging Russian hegemony over Eastern Europe

The first taboo that the EU has overcome concerns the revision of the geopolitical status of the western outskirts of the post-Soviet space. Thus, the EU no longer takes into account Russian claims to the “common neighborhood”, which includes Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Before the war, Brussels avoided the irreversible Europeanization of Eastern Europe, which allowed Russia to protect and maintain its geopolitical influence there.

The categorical revision of the political discourse and the EU’s application in 2022 of nine packages of sanctions initiated the process of de-Russification of the geopolitical space, which previously constituted the “common Russian-European neighborhood.” The inclusion of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in the EU enlargement package changes the dynamics of geopolitical competition between the EU and Russia. One of the main effects of the EU-initiated confrontation is the elimination of the post-Soviet vulnerability of Eastern Europe in relation to Russian factors of influence and destabilization.

The European perspective offered to half of the Eastern Partnership countries not only eliminates the “buffer zone” between the EU and Russia, but also expands the future common Russian-European border. Therefore, the discussion about the “common neighborhood” inevitably turns into a discussion about the management of bilateral borders. However, this presupposes the necessity of successful Europeanization of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, whose reformation is hindered by numerous internal shortcomings. The future ability of Russia to restore and penetrate its sources of influence already within European geopolitical borders depends on the quality of the Europeanization of the three states.

Taboo No. 2: Entering the “intimate” zone of Russia’s geopolitical influence

The second taboo on Russia, which the EU has lifted, concerns Europe’s intention to provide alternative security to states that are part of Russia’s close allies. The decision of the EU to launch an observation mission in Armenia, which is part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), can only be perceived by Moscow as a great strategic risk. Armenia is the only way for Russia to be effectively present in the South Caucasus. The socialization of Armenian decision-makers with European security practices could have knock-on effects, reinforcing steps already taken by the Armenian public to withdraw from the CSTO.

Armenia’s decision to resort to EU aid is connected with the fact that Russia is rapidly losing its geopolitical importance in the region. The effectiveness of the Ukrainian defense and counteroffensive undermined Russia’s image. Therefore, Azerbaijan openly disputes the mandate of Russian peacekeepers stationed in Nagorno-Karabash since 2020. Diplomatically, the EU is actively involved in mediation efforts in the dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding border demarcation and peace negotiations. However, the authoritarian nature of the political regime in Azerbaijan makes it incompatible with the liberal European plan. In any case, Russia realizes that the Armenian government will take any opportunity to get closer to the EU and recover from the disastrous episode of 2013, when Armenia was pressured to abandon the Association Agreement with the EU. Although dependence on Russia is still strong, Armenia is trying to balance its power with the presence of the EU vis-à-vis both Russia and Azerbaijan.

So far, the EU mission, which will start in Armenia in February, is designed for 2 years (the decision was made on January 23). It will operate throughout the territory of Armenia, with a mandate to help prevent tensions on the border with Azerbaijan and normalize relations between the two countries. However, over time, this mission may receive expanded powers, becoming the basis for deepening sectoral cooperation with the EU. The mandate of the EU Mission in Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), which has been extended several times since 2005, can serve as an example of the future role that can be assigned to the Monitoring Mission in Armenia in the field of border administration and migration. management, etc. Although the mission itself does not have a military mandate, Russia may see the risk of using this experience to pave the way for international peacekeeping missions to replace Russian peacekeepers operating in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Taboo No. 3: Military intervention against Russian geostrategic interests

The third taboo, through which the EU came, is of a military nature. The synergy created by the NATO member countries, which are part of the EU, forced Brussels to overcome its complexes related to the arming of third countries with lethal weapons. This premiere is unusual for the EU. Although the EU is not a military bloc, unlike NATO, the EU has agreed to provide military aid to Ukraine in 2022 and will continue to do so in 2023. Ukraine can count on the military assistance of the EU both for the protection and for the liberation of the occupied territories of Russia in 2014. 2022 year. The EU does not put forward any conditions regarding the use of weapons purchased for the Ukrainian military within the internationally recognized national borders of Ukraine.

According to estimates for 2022, the military aid that Ukraine received only from the USA (about 22.8 billion dollars), the United Kingdom (2.3 billion pounds), the EU (3.1 billion euros), Germany (2.2 billion euros) and Poland ($1.8 billion) reaches $30 billion. Together with military support from other NATO and EU countries, the figure for aid to the Ukrainian military exceeds 1/3 of Russia’s military expenditures for 2022 ($77-82 billion). The US promised a new tranche of military aid in the amount of 2.5 billion dollars. The US (total – 27.5 billion USD) raises expectations for the EU, which is currently discussing supplementing the initial budget of the European Peace Instrument in the amount of 5 billion euros for the period 2021-27, in 2023 – only 2 billion euros. In the conditions of Russian military aggression, more than half of the funds of this instrument (3.1 billion euros) are intended for Ukraine.

Given the costs caused by the war, as well as the strategic interest in building up military capabilities, the EU should urgently begin discussions on increasing the defense and security budget. This is extremely necessary both for the EU and for the new accession candidates, Ukraine and Moldova, which cannot rely on the “NATO umbrella” for protection from Russia. In other words, European financial resources are used by the national armies of EU neighboring countries to counter and/or prepare to retaliate against military threats of Russian origin. Read the full article and comment on Contribuotrs.ro