In recent months, the Turkish authorities have reintroduced a practice from the distant past.. The goal, as can be seen from the analysis of the data, is to test in the field the possibility of closing the bays of Asia Minor and the islets belonging to Turkey, with the aim of promoting Ankara’s maximalist positions. It is not clear why Turkey is taking such steps, not excluding the possibility that Ankara wants to show some signs of reaction to the purely philological debate that has unfolded in recent months about a possible partial expansion of territorial waters from 6 to 12 nm. in some parts of Greek territory.

But where does this particular question begin? Since last autumn 2022, the crews of commercial vessels, fishing vessels and other vessels flying the flags of third countries, but always under the flags of Turkey, have often responded to calls for a report (hello) from the Coast Guard (BS), claiming that they are moving within the Turkish borders. territorial waters or international waters. In fact, these ships moved beyond the median line between Asia Minor and the islands, and sometimes even within Greek territorial waters. The recurrence of this phenomenon raised suspicions on the Greek side regarding Turkish attempts to further challenge even the internationally recognized territorial waters of Greece and the starting point of international waters. This activity is incompatible with normal offensive actions such as harassing LS ships. away from the Turkish Coast Guard, but moving in a very different direction.

However, according to well-informed diplomatic and military sources, the Turks appear to be acting on a 1964 presidential decree that is in conflict with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

On the basis of this presidential decree, following the delayed expansion of Turkish territorial waters from 3 to 6 nautical miles, all the bays of Asia Minor in the Aegean Sea and the part of the Eastern Mediterranean touching Greece (from Xiro opposite Samothraki and Zurafa to Kas opposite Kastelorizo) were “closed” with straight baselines. Behind the large bays of the Asia Minor coast (Adrammitiou, Kerameikos, Smyrna, etc.), they closed in straight bases and small bays opposite Lesvos and Chios. Moreover, based on this perception, a triangle was created in the Dardanelles with the projections of Imbros and Tenedos, which significantly shifted the influence of these islands to the west.

In practice, this means that the Turks measure their coastal territorial waters from a straight baseline that closes the bay, transferring the influence of Asia Minor to the Greek islands in a way that in every way violates the existing status quo of 6 AD. m. in the Aegean Sea. The fact that the Turkish authorities have not made any statements supporting this view by any official document leads Athens to conclude that Ankara is testing the waters. An interesting fact is that the ships of the Turkish fleet do not move along these coordinates. This practice is followed exclusively by the Turkish Coast Guard vessels, fishing and merchant vessels of Turkish interests under the flags of third countries.

The Turks appear to be acting under a 1964 presidential decree that is in conflict with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

None of those who dealt with this issue believes that Ankara can seriously return to the practice that it abandoned in the early 1970s, almost half a century ago. In practice, the Turks, after 1973, when UNCLOS discussions began, ending in 1982, never used the assumption of closed bays or baselines including their islets as a starting point for calculating the territorial waters of the coast of Asia Minor. Recall that UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, Greece ratified it in May 1995, and the following month the Turkish National Assembly began to adopt the so-called casus belli in case of expansion of Greek territorial waters.

Since Turkey is not a contracting party to UNCLOS, no one can exclude the possibility of formalizing this concept. It is recalled that the provisions of the Ankara-Tripoli informal agreement (the so-called Turkish-Libyan memorandum) are a gross violation of all UNCLOS concepts, as are Turkey’s claims in the Eastern Mediterranean to the Republic of Cyprus.

Therefore, in Athens, a reasonable question arises whether Ankara will ever try to formalize these ideas. It is recalled that after the so-called Turkish-Libyan Memorandum, Ankara published in writing and in the most official forum of the UN opinions that Greek diplomacy had previously considered extremely difficult to present officially (for example, the connection of the demilitarization of the islands of the eastern Aegean with their sovereignty from Greece). Of course, in the event that Turkey adheres to such a position, Greece cannot but go in the same direction to increase its territorial waters.

Into the microscope

These fine lines, resulting from the changes in daily maritime activity in the Aegean, cannot but be observed very closely from the side of Athens. A completely normal fact, since Athens and Ankara are going through parallel pre-election periods, and everything that is happening in Turkey now automatically falls under the Greek microscope. At the same time, however, the development of events in Libya is being closely monitored in Athens, where, as everything shows (contacts of the oil minister in Washington, the visit of the CIA director to Libya), the American agent is trying to put pressure on the situation in the country in the direction of normalization, i. e. creating conditions for holding elections.

Blinken in Athens

US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s visit to Athens is in its final stages. Mr. Blinken will tour the region and will likely arrive in Greece for contacts on February 21st. It is considered certain that Turkey will be included in the points of his journey. From the Greek side, it is especially important that the heads of American diplomacy will be in Greece and Turkey before the elections in the two countries, which reflects the US desire not to combine the pre-election period with destabilizing movements. in the region.