Belatedly, it is now generally accepted that Turkish aggression will intensify further in 2023. However, there seems to be no problem with the reasonable conclusion that the improvements made in our deterrent force over the past three years are proving insufficient to deter Turkish aggression. . So, what else needs to happen for the consensus aspects of the national strategy to be revised?

Half a century after post-colonization, the first thing to ask ourselves is the real purpose that our strategy serves. Do we continue to expect that Turkey will become disillusioned and give up its ambitions, or that international law or perhaps a third power will impose it on it? Or are we content with the illusion that we prevented her from achieving her goals, while instead she is constantly expanding the scope of her aspirations? Over the same period, in addition to the above, we have spent a lot of diplomatic capital and recorded incalculable lost profits: we were indifferent (with a few exceptions) to the geo-economic wealth of an EEZ four times the size of our territory, but also to the fruits of peaceful understanding. As for our ultra-modern and very expensive weapons programs, they were never available at the right time, since they were almost always implemented after crises (1974, 1987, 1996, 2020).

At the same time, it is noteworthy that, despite our preference for international justice, we ended up using the other two methods of solving problems provided for by international law, i.e. negotiations and mediation. Theoretically, we still idolize the appeal to The Hague as a panacea, ignoring the huge differences from the 1970s and the reversal of Ankara’s course, which now seems to prefer (to us unacceptably) “everything in The Hague.” In reality, however, we have often tried both bilateral negotiations (which we euphemistically call “dialogue”, “exploratory contacts”, “confidence-building measures”, etc.) and mediation by third countries. In the latter, we even resorted to the most dangerous moments (Imia 1996, “Oruç Reis” 2020) in the hope of “restraining” Turkish aggression – to finally collect the observance of “equal distances”. Similar efforts seem to be unfolding behind the scenes even today with the looming crisis of 2023. But without ambitious planning, there is no real hope for a significantly different outcome. For their part, Turkish analysts usually expect Erdogan to “take over everything,” dangerously assuming that Greece will not “lift the gauntlet” of armed confrontation.

The country needs the “wise” use of the two biggest weapons at its disposal: EU membership and international maritime law. In the EU, the lack of a common plan (“Helsinki” is now erroneously reproduced as such) has led to ambiguous statements in support of the 27, even against Turkish revisionism, which Ankara fearlessly mocks. But we also did not use the law of the sea effectively: the 9th country in the world along the coastline chose (inefficiently) to exhaust its interest in 12 nautical miles, ignoring the numerous advantages of the EEZ and notably refraining until today from simply – even if – plotting position coordinates on map. In addition, under the pressure of the (legally non-existent, but existing on the ground) Turkish-Libyan memorandum, we adopted almost unthinkable provisions for demarcation borders with Italy and Egypt.

Turkish analysts are counting on Erdogan to “take everything by the pen,” dangerously assuming that Greece will not “lift the gauntlet” of armed confrontation.

This is due to reflections on the well-received demonstration of dynamism in exploration south of Crete. Does this mean enriching our attitude with elements of Realpolitik before hydrocarbons lose their meaning? In other words, without losing sight of the fundamental importance of international law for our country, have we begun to consider the usefulness of dynamic (rather than reckless) movements? Does our quasi-unilateral demarcation on Libya (the Maniatis map) and Egypt’s positive response to the move indicate a gradual realization that international law alone is not enough to break Putin’s Turkish copycats?

In conclusion, it should be noted that against the backdrop of growing doubts about the post-war “sacred rules” of the inviolability of borders, a reassessment of the national strategy should not be considered unnecessary. Would it be beneficial from a national perspective, in view of the parallel periods of the 2023 elections and important strategic decisions that would be required, to initiate discrete “nationwide consultation exercises” between major party officials (perhaps through joint meetings of the National Foreign Policy Council and KYSEA) to avoid new tragedies like Imian?

* Mr. Yannis Valinakis – Professor, President of the European Center of Excellence/EKPA, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.