The geopolitical fears of former Soviet spy Vladimir Putin and his desire to return Russian boots to Europe have caused a geopolitical boomerang effect. The entire dynamics of the war in Ukraine illuminates a broad picture with many variables that have undergone changes on a global and regional scale.

The power of the Kremlin is a myth, built, as in the Soviet period, on fictions of public image, but Russia remains a military power that should not be neglected

Russia has demonstrated its ability to effectively wage an information war against Europe and intervened in various spheres of influence, but strangely ignored certain cultural aspects of Ukraine. During 2022, we all witnessed the axiomatic antithesis between the failures of the Kremlin and. reassessment by the West of its power. So, the result of the confrontation with Ukraine after ten months of war exposed Russian strategic self-sufficiency and its catastrophic assessments.

Although the Kremlin’s military has asymmetric military and air superiority, it has so far failed in Ukraine. However, it is worth asking whether Has the hype about Russia’s military modernization caused the West to overestimate Moscow’s capabilities, or has Russia not yet launched its advanced technologies?

It is hard to believe that Vladimir Putin would turn his own soldiers into cannon fodder by keeping sophisticated military technology in warehouses, but the geographical reality tells us that Russia is a huge territory to defend, being extremely vulnerable in the east. The wariness of using advanced military technology may have a rational explanation, especially since NATO and Europe have historically demonstrated defensive and predictable behavior toward Russia, and China has been keen to gain insight into the military strategies and capabilities of the parties involved in the conflict. conflict..

The new paradigm of European behavior towards Russia will be preserved in 2023 as well

It must be admitted that the reporting of European states to Russia does not always coincide, but significant changes have taken place. We have witnessed a shift in Berlin’s rhetoric in the post-Merkel era, which will continue for at least three years, so a much firmer German policy stance vis-à-vis Russia will help steer European policy on this issue. Although the change in political stance during Scholz’s tenure is noticeable, German public opinion regarding Russian aggression has not changed.

The war in Ukraine created greater resolve on NATO’s eastern flank

The Baltic and Eastern Flank countries are not going to change their attitude towards Russia any time soon, so in 2023 we may see more efforts to turn the transatlantic and European agenda eastward, led by Poland, which is strongly supported by Romania. Hungary will remain a rebel and allied ally of Moscow on NATO’s eastern flank, while Bulgaria will remain in a state of strategic quiescence. In this equation of the transatlantic east, Turkey has a more particular and atypical profile, being geopolitically conditioned by the regional context of the South Caucasus and the Middle East.

The year 2023 will strengthen the perception of the global path to the articulation of power centers

The poles of power are being realigned towards a world with bipolar tendencies, where the USA and China will compete for their dominance, and Russia is already sliding towards the status of a regional power, registering a geopolitical decline. China does not benefit from a large system of alliances, it is not ideologically compelling, but it relies on economic power, growing military power and its presence in international organizations. In competition with the US, China’s incomplete profile and its dependence on Western markets increase the gap in power, putting it in the position of a contender for global hegemony.

American leadership remains critical to the preservation of international order

President Biden prevented a new Cold War, when Europe could not have done it alone. China’s economy is globally integrated, and sanctions will hit it much harder than Russia. The firmness of President Biden, the system of US alliances and partnerships, and the ability to roll back general Western economic restrictions have kept China away from Russia in possible attempts to ignite a new Cold War from west to east.

The most powerful economies in the world have the ability to use coercive diplomacy, but they have not been able to stop the violation of international law by tyrants.

In 2023, under the leadership of the United States, the Western community will combine political, economic and military power in its efforts to preserve a liberal, rules-based international order.

China appears to be the big winner amid the war in Ukraine. He is closely studying and drawing lessons from the military capabilities of the West and Russia, has negotiated lucrative energy deals with Moscow, and is actively trying to project his influence in Central Asia as Russia weakens.

Three regional challenges

1. Restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty

Now we are at a dead end. President Biden has said that he is not ready or willing to start negotiations with Putin, but any willingness to settle in one form or another will draw the US into dialogue.

President Zelenskyi has faced pressure from domestic conservative and nationalist groups not to negotiate or compromise with Moscow before this invasion. At the same time, for the Kremlin, the central and traditional goal was to control the regimes in the states of its orbit. It can be predicted that in 2023, Russia will intensify its efforts to change political regimes or preserve vassals.

Putin would not go to war, but he had to; power in international relations means influence, and power is obtained inexpensively by capturing the main political poles of the states that the Russian Federation considers as its sphere of influence.

Today, Ukrainians have the so-called The Zelensky effectmaking it difficult for Moscow to achieve its goal of regime change in Kyiv, but the Kremlin’s efforts will intensify, but its chances of success are difficult to predict.

The Russians have always been good at espionage and blackmail, but have been weaker in conventional combat. In 2023, it is necessary to pay more attention to the non-traditional dimension of war, because Russia’s influence operations and interference in the internal political environment of states are still quite dangerous for the entire region.

2. Nuclear factor

Russia’s strategic nuclear behavior has not changed much. During 2022, the nuclear lever was mainly used as a psychological factor demonstrating narrative valences to support the idea of ​​great power status, as well as a coercive lever or deterrence tool to condition negotiations and military support for Ukraine.

We will talk more in 2023 security dilemma and the strategic consequences of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Crimea. With the loss of the Crimean peninsula, Russia would lose its own the status quo the sea outlet to the Black Sea and the outlet to the south, to the warm waters of the Planetary Ocean. Blocking its fleet in the north or in the Caspian Sea involves existential strategic and geopolitical arguments for Moscow, which could lead to an escalation of Russian nuclear discourse.

So, the question naturally arises: What scenarios will we go through?

In the Crimea, we will have a normal war with huge losses on both sides (?); will we witness an escalation of nuclear rhetoric or will a compromise be possible through negotiations, as in the demilitarized zone?

One thing is for sure that 2023 will contain great challenges in the Black Sea.

Based on this reasoning, we could see the usefulness of the dialogues with Moscow, in which probably Presidents Scholz and Macron are participating in part of this game to grope Putin.

In the strategic documents of the Russian Federation regarding its nuclear position for 2020 and 2021, a “gray” interpretation was laid that Moscow reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to end a conventional war. In this situation, the doctrinal distinction between a strategic response and a nuclear attack disappears.

However, in the event of a nuclear attack, regardless of its scale, Putin’s negotiating power will collapse and President Xi Jinping will put his hands on his head and find himself in the most difficult position. Xi Jinping will be asked to explain his ability to maintain a strategic nuclear balance vis-à-vis Moscow, as well as his relationship with Putin before the invasion. Putin’s mistakes and Russia’s nuclear option could push Beijing into international isolation.

3. A new hotspot is about to emerge in the South Caucasus

Iran is a traditional strategic concern for Israel because of its nuclear program and historical rivalry. The redeployment of Russian military forces from the Caucasus and Syria to the Ukrainian front and the new exchange of military technology between Iran and Russia indicate that Moscow has further lost its regional potential for scope in Iranian file, making other geopolitical concessions that we don’t know about. In recent years, Israel has developed a strategic military, intelligence, technology and energy alliance with Azerbaijan, and Tehran has increasingly conducted military exercises on Azerbaijan’s southern border while seeking to support Armenia’s military ambitions. It is possible that the traditional rivalry between Iran and Israel finds echoes in the South Caucasus, where Tehran claims historical and imperial rights. These effects occur against the backdrop of Russia’s geopolitical decline and its inability to balance regionally and win the war in Ukraine. Read the full article and comment on Contribuotrs.ro