As a result of wider polarization, attempts by successive governments to adopt a conventional electoral system have failed. Whether we like it or not, the next election will be held on a simple proportional basis, against the background of growing threats from Ankara and the already visible possibility of an unprecedented crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially between the first and second rounds of elections.

This scenario is perhaps the most nightmarish in recent decades and is associated with the geopolitical dimension of the next and subsequent elections. Either by open defiance or by accident, scenarios of war entered the daily lives of Greek citizens. There are many factors contributing to the escalation with Turkey, even to the point that large military exercises with the United States and France are even considered during this period. But it is doubtful that military deterrence (by itself) can solve the problem, especially in an unstable guerrilla environment. The question arises how Greek political parties can avoid internal conflict, which will allow the crisis to play on the weaknesses of the Greek political system. What can Greek political parties learn from the experience of other states with similar conditions?

At the first level, the most basic is to familiarize the parties and their voters with the state systems, which until now were unknown to the Greek citizens. Secondly, preparing both parties and other institutions (Supreme Court/Judiciary, Presidency) for “extreme scenarios”, for example, if a high-intensity Greek-Turkish conflict breaks out between the midterm elections, which would require the formation of at least a period of national government. The possibility of an independent government in the near future seems almost impossible, since the current percentage of parties would require two or more electoral contests. Even so, there is no certainty that a one-party government will be able to handle a future crisis on its own, especially if it has a narrow majority.

To date, international experience (see Campbell and Hall: The Paradox of Vulnerability, Princeton University Press) shows that broader consensus and government cooperation facilitates external risk management, either in terms of alliances or economic crisis management. In addition to being the most likely scenario, a government of national unity would also act as a means to contain the escalation of the crisis, or alternatively to manage it with the greatest credibility. Ideally, through careful negotiations, the next government will have the opportunity to resolve the problems with Turkey that have led us to the current crisis. In other words, Greece cannot afford not to have a culture of consent.

International experience shows that broader consensus and cooperation between governments contributes to the management of external risks.

The next few weeks will be extremely important for Greek politicians on many levels. Scenarios with a minority government, such as in Scandinavia, are already being discussed, as well as alternative scenarios with multi-party options, such as in Central Europe. On the one hand, government officials’ insistence on holding dual elections strengthens the voices of broad opposition in favor of a broader consensus government, posing the existential question of survival for left-wing parties: either cooperate in the next election or allow the incumbent to ultimately dominate. On the other hand, New Democracy itself is likely to change its position before the elections and seek a broader centrist coalition, highlighting its advantages and especially the consensual nature of its leader.

Contrary to Greek prevailing opinion, consensual democracies are considered to be more efficient, socially more just (see Leiphart), and more resilient to managing major national and economic crises. Consensus democracies are based on the logic of simple proportionality, which is effectively applied in almost all EU countries. every day, confirming their performance. In the case of Greece, critics point to a lack of political culture. However, it is significant that there are examples of societies that did not have a culture of cooperation, but were built on the state experience of other countries, such as Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands. There are many examples on the European continent, since as a rule all countries follow the logic of electoral alliances even in regions like South Tyrol and Northern Ireland where there was no experience of reconciliation and some parties were also identified with communal violence (the conditions are much worse than in Greece ).

A similar idea is Switzerland’s “magic formula,” as the country’s specific system has been called, which allows each party to propose specific members to the federal council, who are brought before parliament and only if they gain confidence. other parties, they may assume public duties. This facilitates the selection of people who enjoy wider recognition, as well as the rejection of “extremes” in accordance with democratic procedures. The Swiss formula shows that this system can be successfully implemented even informally or on a transitional basis, which is expected to lead to an immediate state solution if a self-sustaining government does not appear in the next elections.

* Mr. Neophytos Loizidis is Professor at the University of Kent and Director of the Conflict Analysis Research Center (CARC).