The synthesis of modern analysis of the war in Ukraine shows us that we have entered a new phase, the characteristics of which are so different from those at the beginning of the conflict, even since the beginning of the summer, that it can be tempting to confuse analytical discourse with emotional-idealistic one.

The change came suddenly, it was a surprise, although it could have been predicted, indeed predicted. Back on August 12, in an intervention for Sens Politic, Professor Armand Gosu said that “Ukraine is close to seizing a strategic initiative.” It was not about excessive optimism, but about the dramatic evolution of relations on the ground, the evolution that was embodied in the success of the Ukrainian counteroffensive at the beginning of September. Now the front line is moving against the Russian army, the euphoria from the liberation of some territories occupied by it emphasizes the dissymmetry that has existed since the beginning of the war between the motivations of the Ukrainian and Russian forces. The moments of confusion, symbolized by the abandonment of Russian military equipment in several areas, demonstrated the fragility of the occupier, one might even say that it loomed a prospect that even some in the West said they wanted to avoid: the humiliation of the great Red Army.

This perspective may reach the very roots of the Putinist political regime. Born in a victorious war (the one in Chechnya, i.e. from its own territory), Vladimir Putin’s regime from the beginning focused on rehabilitating state authority, starting with the dominance of a militarized elite. The more freedoms were curtailed and the vestiges of electoral democracy removed, the more important military victories became. First of all, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as the campaign in Georgia in 2008, the intervention in Syria in 2015, as well as the more or less predictable interventions in several African states increasingly link the ideology and legitimacy of the entire military and international regime prestige, which the Russian Federation (is) fighting for. The culmination of this ideological and institutional construction was the attack on Kyiv. The response to the initial failure of the offensive on the Ukrainian capital was to continue the war, a response that demonstrated how ill-equipped the Putin regime is to lose a war, especially this one. Defeats at the front in recent weeks, then the decision on partial mobilization reinforce the conclusion that the regime cannot survive defeat. At the same time, in the current context, Russia’s victory looks increasingly unlikely. In other words, the survival of Putin’s regime also becomes unlikely.

Putin’s isolation from the international level, which was talked about too early, has now become a reality. He has practically no real allies. Those who initially encouraged Russian aggression with their neutrality, today invoke the same neutrality in order not to help Russia. At the same time, the energy blackmail of the West failed. Although the effects of the embargo are being felt by the Russian arms industry, Ukraine is benefiting from increasingly effective weapons. Faced with this dissymmetry of resources in favor of Ukraine, Putin, in a speech on September 21, discarded his last assets: the reserve of people and nuclear blackmail.

The attempt to turn the occupied regions (some of which have already been partially liberated) into annexed regions, and therefore belong to the Russian Federation, by means of fake referendums, does not inspire confidence at the international level. But this is the way Putin hopes to turn the war against Ukraine into a domestic war, to protect his own territory and thereby restore his political legitimacy. This time it is not based on achieved military victories, but from the perspective of defeat. This is not about a simple change in the propaganda discourse, but even about a sudden change in the core of the Putinist discourse and the type of its legitimacy. The shift in perspective is so brutal that it signals to us a lack of solutions, rather than a real alternative to reclaiming our own power.

Yesterday the victory legitimized the authoritarian system, today the risk of defeat must justify the legal defense of the initially conquered territories. In fact, this prospect of defeat discredits the entire ideological approach of Putinism. Stalin, when he was on the edge of the abyss, resorted to the patriotic reserve and rediscovered Orthodoxy, Putin also exhausted them, he has no other resources for collective mobilization. Putinism was essentially doctrinal opportunism, it had internalized many contradictions, it could be reinvented if it had absolute control over power. When cracks appear, when the source of legitimacy is exhausted, it cannot be reinvented.

It is known that the most dangerous moment for an authoritarian-totalitarian regime is the inheritance of power. The prospect of defeat makes the issue of succession more serious than ever. Social discontent caused by the mobilization of reservists will grow, but no less destabilizing power of Putin is threatened by the use of weapons of mass destruction. “This is not a bluff,” Putin emphasized in a recent speech days before President Biden anticipated the threat, replying “Don’t! No need! No need!”. Not only does nuclear blackmail not work (beyond what the doctrine of nuclear deterrence has already told us), we have seen this since the first phase of the war, but today this type of blackmail is even more unreliable because it comes from a much weakened power. manager By trying to instill fear in Western societies, a cornered Putin risks being taken seriously, especially by those who are supposed to implement such an order. And who wants to participate in collective suicide? Removing the leader is cheaper. Read the whole article and comment on Contributors.ro