Russia’s attack on Ukraine, a state that the Kremlin leader has made clear that he no longer accepts within its current borders (the Ukrainian nation, in his opinion, is an artificial entity).[i]in fact, part of the Great Russian national “family”, the Slavs Russian peace, русский мир), after which the international pole of support collapses in favor of Kyiv, has spawned a rather rich specialized literature devoted to how this brutal questioning of the international order (and current international law) could also force other revisionist states to try to use force to obtain more “correct” borders, according to their leaders and a significant part of the associated population. China is a state with global aspirations (so far mainly at the geo-economic level), is often considered a direct rival of the US for systemic hegemony, and its special strategic partnership relationship has strengthened with Russia (see the “boundless” partnership announced by the two heads of state in February 2022) forces to analyze the already mentioned events very carefully.

Currently, both Ukraine and Taiwan are, in theory, benefiting or likely to benefit from direct economic and military support from what we generally refer to as the “enlarged/enlarged West” (the US, European NATO allies, Canada, Japan, Australia, possibly South). Korea). In the long run, the balance of power tends to shift toward China, but in the short run, the US and its allies can maintain a satisfactory technological, scientific, and military advantage. On the other hand, Russia and China, united by a partnership that some analysts see as a kind of tacit quasi-alliance, and jointly opposing US unipolar dominance and demo-liberal values, naturally want to weaken the West by highlighting internal divisions. , which already exist, and by means of armaments and economic and technological development (internal balancing) and in the long term aim to form a coalition of anti-American states (Iran, Venezuela, Syria, etc.), a mechanism of external balancing.

In addition, Ukrainians and Taiwanese represent for Russia and China population segments that both Eurasian states want to integrate into a structure of collective identity supported by officially disseminated national myths, but face their opposition in the form of denial of identities imposed by authoritarian Moscow and Beijing. While V. Putin sees the Ukrainian nation as an integral part of the Russian world (“Russian world”), Xi Jinping sees (like all heads of state of the PRC before him) the population of Taiwan as only a part of the Chinese nation. The doctrine of the “Chinese Dream”, so often trumpeted in Beijing, envisages full national reunification, not just economic, technological and military growth at incredibly high levels. Therefore, Ukraine and Taiwan live under the specter of war and risk invasion and partial or complete loss of sovereignty over their national territories. There is a fear that Russia’s success in the campaign against Ukraine may be seen by Beijing as a strategic failure of the US (the main sponsor of the Ukrainian military effort), and the temptation to attack will arise, which will lead to the eventual occupation of Taiwan.

Washington’s policy of ambiguity complicates the deterrence strategy

We must reiterate, China cannot know for sure whether America will intervene militarily to defend Taiwan, because of the policy of ambiguity that Washington deliberately cultivates, knowing that the US and Taiwan are not officially allies, and that Taiwan’s territory is vital for the deployment of forces by Americans in East Asia.[ii] If it comes to war, it is more likely that the military forces of the People’s Republic of China will still win it, being much more effective than the Russian ones in Ukraine. With a naval blockade, Beijing could block much of the military aid Taiwan could receive from the outside. Unless, of course, the Americans intervene decisively (alone or with the help of some regional allies) and push back the Chinese naval and air forces around the besieged island.

Washington had no military commitments to Ukraine in February 2022, as did other NATO members. But these allied countries decided to offer the attacked country numerous weapons, ammunition, as well as financial, humanitarian and diplomatic support in order to block the victory of Russia and implicitly a new forceful change of the borders of the largest European power (after the 2014 Crimea-related and after the territorial amputation of Georgia in 2008). By the end of August 2022, the Americans had invested more than 13.5 billion US dollars in support of Ukraine alone (security aid). More than 45 countries on the world map helped Ukraine militarily or economically. The more the Americans and their allies invest in supporting Kyiv’s military effort, the harder it will be for them to accept its defeat, and, logically, the tendency will be to continue and even increase the level of aid. At the same time, there are voices that the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) is already underfunded.[iii] A Chinese attack on Taiwan would force Washington to quickly allocate billions—many more billions—to bolster its resilience. Very large spending in favor of Kyiv and Taipei could cause domestic scandal and even more obvious political polarization in the US.

As for Taiwan, the US cannot abandon it in the face of a Chinese ultimatum or a massive invasion, because it would lose the credibility of its allies (not only in the Asia-Pacific region) and access to territory that provides the possibility of power projection to the East. and Southeast Asia. American strategists call the island a stationary unsinkable aircraft carrier.[iv] Geographically, it is part of the first island chain around China, which it seeks to control in order to establish A2/AD capabilities and force the US to withdraw militarily as far from Chinese territory as possible. It is obvious that even China cannot give up its claim to sovereignty over the island, since Chinese nationalism has this very aspect as one of its main claims. Xi Jinping cannot ensure domestic peace and order if he turns against him nationalist elements within the party as well as at the street level. By controlling the island, the PRC will strengthen its military security, make it difficult for potential adversaries to access the South China and East China Seas, and gain access to advanced technology. The occupation of some of the smaller islands belonging to the Republic of China, rather than Formosa, may be a temporary solution to avoid US military intervention, but it will not be able to calm the geopolitical impulses of Chinese nationalists. . But an attack on Taiwan could eventually trigger a regional conflict, even cascading, involving states wary of China’s expansion, such as those with whom it has disputes over delimitation of islands and territorial waters in the South China Sea, as well as India, Australia and Japan.

Moscow has already used military force and changed the borders of Georgia and Ukraine, in the latter case increasing its national territory through its possession of Crimea. It is possible that at some point it will announce that South Ossetia is also part of the Russian Federation. The reaction to Western sanctions shows that in the perception of decision-makers in Moscow, aggression against Ukraine, an independent state, reflects Russia’s sovereign will, and sanctions strike at Russia’s sovereignty, being an offensive act.[v]

For its part, China refrained from forcibly annexing some islands belonging to Taiwan (Pescador, Matsu, Kemoi, etc.), although in 1955 and 1958 it resorted to military intimidation, hoping to occupy them. It later used coercion against (South) Vietnam, occupying part of the disputed Paracel Islands in 1974.[vi] It is undisputed that the PRC would justify the attack on Taiwan as an act of reparation for historical injustice, and would also invoke the legitimacy derived from the national sovereignty of the entire Chinese people over all territories that once belonged to Imperial China. Its supposed will to unite, in turn, is organically connected with the so-called “century of humiliation”, that is, the period between 1839 and 1945, when the country was attacked and partially conquered by external forces. An obsession with past humiliation haunts the collective imagination of Chinese officials as well as much of the population, and the classic slogan translated into English would be: never again Thus, a war against the US and even its allies can be justified by national interests. Without any guarantees that the PRC will not be defeated and plunge into the “century of humiliation 2.0”. In this case, the communist regime and Xi Jinping will likely be removed by a revolution or coup d’état.

The Biden administration has drawn a “red line” in relations with China, asking it not to provide military support to Russia to support its campaign in Ukraine. Beijing reacted angrily, saying that it fully understood the reasons why Moscow did so, blaming the US and NATO, the West as such. There are political scientists who believe that there is a secret Sino-Russian agreement to challenge US global dominance, and questioning the existing territorial order would be a strategy to test the resilience of Washington and its allies.[vii] It is not excluded, but not certain. In the future, everything can develop in this direction. Or not. There is no certainty in international relations. The leadership of Russia and China will decide the future of bilateral relations and actions towards the US (and its allies) based on perceptions, environment, ideology, power calculations, strategic identity and the interests that flow from them.

Autocracies dream of… multipolarity

Both China and Russia claim to be true democracies, want the democratization of the international system and multipolarity, condemning American military hegemony and Western values. They seek to increase their national territory (and maritime territory under national control), and the use of force is not excluded, as we can clearly see on the example of the war that Moscow unleashed in Ukraine.

What matters is whether decision-makers in Beijing believe their country is still on an upward curve that will continue for the long term, or whether they believe it has reached a plateau and is in decline.[viii] In the first case, strategic optimism determines a calm, predictable behavior even in crisis situations, but in the second case, it can protect against strategic pessimism, irritation, impatience, aggressiveness, which masks weakness and fear that a window of opportunity exists during the boom period, it closes .[ix] The same should be observed in the case of Russia. This second scenario favors aggressive behavior devoid of any desire for compromise and negotiation, which can more easily provoke war. Read the full article and comment on Contributors.ro