Statement on the speech of Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Vouliaglio, remarks were made Evangelos Venizelosafter the Prime Minister’s report to him.

Recall that Mr. Mitsotakis mentioned:

“Of course, public figures should be protected, but not separated and feel like they are in a state of inviolability. If, Mr. Tsipras, you agree with Mr. Venizelos’ point of view, come out and say so, but think about how the Golden Dawn broke up.”

In his statement, Mr. Venizelos notes:

“Mr. Kyriakos Mitsotakis considered it appropriate to personally protest before Parliament my scientific position that MPs (and therefore the Prime Minister, party leaders, ministers, but, as we shall see, the President of the Republic himself) are surrounded by special constitutional guarantees in regarding the confidentiality of their communications.

However, at the same time, Mr. Mitsotakis politely agreed that increased guarantees should apply to public figures and called on the parties to contribute to the formation of this special base. On what constitutional basis can special statutory provisions be made for public figures, derogating from the principle of equality invoked with simplistic zeal?

On what constitutional basis will the prime minister’s private telephone secrecy be protected from an unscrupulous EYP commander who obtains the prosecutor’s permission to tap the prime minister’s mobile phone by giving the prosecutor only a number with no name and no reason?

Does Mr. Mitsotakis think that the government, citing national security concerns, with the approval of one or even two prosecutors, can put all its political opponents under constant surveillance?

Does Mr. Mitsotakis think that the EYP should treat political leaders as if they were foreigners suspected of being spies? If not, how and where is it constitutionally enshrined?

Mr. Mitsotakis referred to the case of the Golden Dawn deputies. I hope it became clear to him that it is one thing to remove secrecy to verify a particularly serious crime on a reasoned will of the appellate board, and another thing to remove secrecy for reasons of “national security” that do not constitute a crime, the removal of which is carried out at the request of the EMP without justification, often without mentioning the name of the person under investigation and by a simple prosecutor’s decision, not substantiated.

In the case of the Golden Dawn, after the tragic murder of Fissa, there was an automatic felony, the removal of a parliamentary fugitive did not require the permission of Parliament, justice had to act immediately, as it did during the Samar-Venizelos government. The AXA MPs were not under prior surveillance for reasons of national security. Subsequently, the protection of external elements of telephone conversations between the parties involved, including parliamentarians, followed. Let Mr. Mitsotakis let me know better than he what happened then and what initiatives Antonis Samaras and I took.

According to Article 62 Comp. to delete the telephone secret of a deputy, the permission of the Parliament is required for the purpose of investigating a particularly serious crime, and before permission, no investigative actions affecting the deputy personally (Article 56 part 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), such as a physical search and many other things related to his personal data and conversations. Unless it’s arbitrariness.

The removal of telephone secrecy for reasons of national security, and not for a particularly serious crime, is allowed in accordance with Article 19 Part 1 of the Code. must be done by the judiciary and not by the EYP with the mere approval of the prosecutor. This is an unfavorable measure, which, according to the criteria of the ECtHR case law (the Engel criteria), is of a criminal nature. Therefore, Article 62 Comp. with its guarantees and exclusions.

In addition, article 61, paragraph 3, parliamentary secrecy applies, which protects information received and provided by a Member of Parliament.

Articles 61 and 62 Comp. they establish not the personal privileges of a deputy and a member of the European Parliament (prime minister, minister), but an institutional guarantee for the normal functioning of the state. Relevant is the provision of Article 49, Part 1, Clause 2, Art. b’ for PtD.

Otherwise, what is the point of parliamentary control over the EYP through the Committee on Institutions and Transparency, if the EYP can control the members of the Committee on Institutions and Transparency? Or can the EMP now also monitor the members of a commission of inquiry that will be set up to investigate any leaks from parliamentary debates that could affect national security?

Therefore, I ask Mr. Mitsotakis, if he does not want to respect my political views, to be careful and take into account my legal opinions. This could help him cope with the crisis of a centralized and one-man model of power.”