Over the past 24 hours, the press services received reports from “closed” sources of information, according to which the National Intelligence Service allegedly recorded telephone conversations of 7-8 more politicians with a “legitimate” communication system in the previous period. .
It is alleged that specific information, which has yet to be proven, has been brought to the attention of the heads of control mechanisms, who are responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of communications. In order to ascertain the accuracy of the information, the same sources of information state that a retrospective investigation of the declassification provisions that were activated by the EEM in previous months is being considered. However, government sources insisted they had no information, not even indications, that the secrecy had been lifted from other political figures.

The Predator software was developed by Cytrox of North Macedonia. Cytrox was acquired by Intellexa SA, which was recommended in Greece in March 2020 by Israeli Tal Dilian. Dilian was a member of his country’s secret services and was involved in the wiretapping scandal in Cyprus. From March 2020 to June 2021, the manager of Intellexa SA was a man named F.B.

F. B. served on the boards of directors of several other companies. Like, for example, Baywest Business Hellas, together with the Polish pelchar Stanislav Simon, at one time the administrator of Krikel, based in Marousi. Krikel Sole Proprietorship signed 7 contracts between 2018 and 2021 with the Greek Ministry of Civil Protection and Police, six of which are confidential. Some refer to the Tetra communication system from EL.AS. and one in counter-surveillance equipment procured by the Office of Intelligence Management (IDM). In June, the offices of Intellexa and Krikel were visited by auditors from the National Transparency Authority (NDA). Their task was to find out whether these two companies supplied EYP or the Ministry of Civil Protection with Predator software. In their opinion dated July 10, they indicate that they have not identified direct contracts for the supply of either Intellexa or Krikel, either with EYP or with EL.AS. In the case of Intellexa, the connection with Predator is obvious, representatives of Krikel deny any connection.

It is impossible to formulate a definite answer. Government sources vehemently deny that the EPA or any other agency paid for the Predator and its required infrastructure. The question remains who made the relevant “investment” and whether EYP or another agency, or even a businessman who apparently represented them, received any information for a fee. The lease scenario is based on the sequence of use of the legal reference system and the Predator in the cases of Koukakis and Androulakis.

On July 12, 2021, journalist Thanasis Koukakis’ mobile phone was hijacked by illegal software after he received a trap message with a fake link to edolio5.blogspot.com. A year earlier, citing national security concerns, the EMP began declassifying the legal communications system. In September 2021, respectively, a trap message was sent to Nikos Andrulakis with the same fake link. The PASOK president did not “click” on the website, and EYP proceeded to declassify it through a legal linking system, which was terminated approximately twenty-four hours after he was named PASOK leader.

A retrospective investigation of the EEM declassification provisions is being considered to determine whether other political figures were also under surveillance.

Added to this is information about several more individuals who received such trap messages using the Predator software, as well as about businessmen who, in the role of intermediaries, asked for money in the past to intercept telephone conversations on demand. conversations using illegal software without being sure that they are just bluffing. Sources EL.AS. told “K” that in closed meetings for serious police investigations, service employees hinted at the possibility of intercepting messages exchanged through encrypted applications by targeted individuals. A feature that the well-known EYP and EL.AS interface systems do not have, which cannot listen to conversations or read messages from WhatsApp, Viber, etc.

Some argue that a particular monitoring system remains the property of a private company, while EYP and a small number of people use the software for a fee. “The Predator,” they say, “was not bought, but leased for a certain period.” One of the arguments given is that the cost of its purchase is particularly high, as it amounts to 25-28 million euros, and the necessary infrastructure reaches 6 million. Secondly, EYP does not have a structure for the use of such a “tool” within the country. The version about the lease was approved by one of the central defendants in the case, who spoke with K in the middle of the week. He even claimed that this happened in agreement with a foreign intelligence agency.

Many associate the above with the initiative of the Ministry of Defense to create the Center for Technological Support, Development and Innovation (KETYAK), located not in the building of the central service on Katechaki Avenue, but at the facility of the Ministry of Defense. in Agia Paraskevi. They note that KETYAK, according to its charter, provides management flexibility, since, in addition to access to secret means, it reports directly and only to the commander of the service. A government source ruled out any association of the specific facility with the Predator, stressing that “the most important part of our services is for external purposes only.”

The same facility was also rumored to house a female police officer who served as Deputy Director of the Office of Homeland Security and was removed from her position due to the revelations. However, with some information that separates her movement from current events, attributing it to a serious health problem she faced.

However, the question remains which Greek or foreign center provided the money for the plant required to operate the Predator in Athens.

The question remains unanswered, since the first reports from government sources about declassification at the request of foreign countries were categorically refuted. The declassification order mentions national security concerns, and only an investigation into the contents of the confidential file brought to the attention of prosecutor Vasiliki Vlachos can provide answers. If it survives, it is expected that it will not contain a request for surveillance by a friendly secret service, but a summary of the information that served as a reason for the surveillance. It is interesting to note that two months after Mr. Androulakis’ surveillance began, the EMP and prosecutor Ms. Vlahova issued a new order extending the removal of confidentiality for another two months.

EYP’s internal provision stipulates that the file containing the content of the surveillance – in this case, Nikos Androulakis – may be deleted after the investigation is completed. It is surprising, however, that while the PASOK president was first called by government representatives to explain the reasons why he was under surveillance, then government spokesman Yiannis Oikonomou then hinted that the surveillance materials had been destroyed.

In the previous period, more than 200 EMP employees were transferred to other state structures. The first group of employees served in the Department of Defense Electronic Information Administration and was transferred to the National Defense General Staff (GEETHA). At the end of 2021, another 150 employees were dismissed from service in connection with the transfer to the Police and the Ministry of Citizens’ Protection. This question sparked a reaction from SYRIZA, when Deputy Minister of Citizens’ Protection Lefteris Oikonomou spoke of “wonderful and experienced staff” who will enhance EL.AS services. Already at the end of 2021, the transferred employees sent out-of-court protests to the government leadership, and after the recent resignation of the EMP commander, they intend to sue Mr. Kontoleontos and the government leadership. And in EL.AS. however, there is a buzz, as many of the defendants in the wiretapping case are “accused” of demobilizing or dismissing experienced and capable officers from their posts. Few believe that in the next period some of those who have been transferred to refrigeration units will require reinstatement in the positions they have held until now.

Terms of privacy cancellation in the EU – US

In the US, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act allows federal security agencies to monitor suspect communications if they have received permission from the Special Office of Counterintelligence, an agency whose activities are classified, but also by order of the Attorney General without prior trial. order. Call recording laws in most US states require at least one party to a conversation to know that the call is being recorded.

The European Union, in line with the European Parliament Directive of 2006 on the legal surveillance of telephone conversations, has introduced a strict framework. The law provides for the storage of data on the communication of citizens for a period of up to two years with the provision of this data to the prosecutor’s office or court, if necessary. However, strict European legislation provides for the acceleration of this process and the provision of real-time data in cases of imminent threat to national security. US law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and NSA have used universal surveillance and interception software for data and communications, such as Carnivore, a veritable data “vacuum cleaner” that has been in operation since 2013.