“40 An ethical act is much riskier than a utilitarian act, because through it we may endanger the common.”

Well said, but only mentally (if not only aesthetically) and oratorically and discursively can threaten the universal ethical act. In fact, it cannot. On the other hand, doesn’t the utilitarian act (“pure”) cancel the universal directly, since, in its omnipresence, it neglects it, destroys it? Reminder: In thesis-assumption 28 he said the much truer/plausible fact about evil is that it represents “the attempt of the particular to replace the universal, the finite to become eternal.”

“41 The only thing ethical facts have in common is their form, not their content. General and defining”.

The same is true for many other terms. However, at least in this case the word could be implied aesthetic. Because between “form” and “beauty” there can be a common field, ubiquitous complexities, touches. No matter how dramatic, sad, or terrible the road or scaffolding (with a “happy” ending) of any ethical act may be, the final catharsis still brings at least an end that is not only “good” but also more or less self-evident . aesthetic, elegant, refined.

“42 Prin selfless we must understand exalted above the self-appetite of the concrete and interested in the universal.”

Wonderful – not just Kantian, as everywhere, but even the so-called Neuchanian!

“43 Indebtedness to natural persons arises from indebtedness to the law.”

Here we are in empiricism, in the profane social. Because ethical duties (personal or otherwise) go beyond any law. On the other hand, detachment from others means something completely different to the realized sage, having nothing to do with the misanthropy of the petty self (“I owe nothing to anyone”, “I don’t care what others say”), indifferent to others and constantly violating a law based on misanthropic, egophilic, unethical individualism.

“44 Repressive ethics is a false ethics and has a utilitarian character: it replaces the ethical principle with the self-interest of a given order, rooted in a false universality (here the demand for happiness is a justified polemical act and can be translated in ethical terms), and on the other hand, a part requires from an individual of delusional self-transcendence who plunges into the private; only the ethical act begins where manipulation ends, which is only a form of utilitarian determination (group interest). In this sense, there is also no repressive morality, since the ethical act goes beyond any repression and begins where freedom begins.’

Extremely cut, in one breath, we have here the concentration of a whole chapter of the book. It is worth re-reading. Until then, Ethics or Moral Law do not represent the common good, repressive ethics (specific to legal) are the only ones that the masses can understand and access, activate/deactivate. Petru Cretius speaks (also here) of the ethical act as the Ethical Act, known only to those who go beyond human laws/norms/customs, already possessing Freedom (spirit) unknown to many people. However, finally, among the strong metaphysical terms, a useful distinction (of the type) is inserted authentic ethics, false ethics, ethical falsity.

“45 Ninety percent of the institutions that currently exist in the world are institutions of control and arbitration and are based on mistrust between people, that is, on the statistical superiority of blind utilitarian tendencies.”

Very correct (regardless of era/system, therefore also very relevant)!

“46 Justice can be a utilitarian act of arbitration between utilitarian-oriented wills (rejection of a specific good for a specific good). On the ethical level, justice is the free submission of all wills to the ethical law and is just another definition of morality.”

Isn’t the arbitration between utilitarianisms a secondary, elementary definition of justice? Whereas in ethics, where justice must mean and do something quite different, it advances with EVERYTHING else definition.

“47 The laws of utilitarian good and the moral law sometimes prescribe the same actions, but not the ability, but their orientation is decisive.”

If orientation rather than “ability” is crucial, then the same facts/acts can belong to, straddle, or oscillate between the utilitarian and the moral as one and the same realm. On the other hand, it should also be noted that without renewal/actualization/reification, “orientation” can only remain an ideal, an aspiration, a literature, a philosophy. It would be Being without Being, but if the latter did not exist (at least where it does not exist), then there would be no consciousness that Being exists. Thus canceling the very meaning (human perception/concept) of Being, its “ability” to be postulated, confirmed, acquired.

“48 Happiness can be obtained even by ignoring or violating the ethical law.” Read more at Contributors.ro